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FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE IN RUSSIA Virus type Asia1 (follow-up report No. 2)

Information received on 10 September 2005 from Dr Evgueny A. Nepoklonov, Head of the Main Veterinary Department, Ministry of Agriculture and Food, Moscow:

End of previous report period: 22 June 2005 (see *Disease Information*, **18** [26], 184, dated 1 July 2005).

End of this report period: 7 September 2005.

Precise identification of agent: foot and mouth disease (FMD) virus serotype Asia1.

Date of first confirmation of the event: 12 June 2005.

Date of start of the event: 6 June 2005.

Nature of diagnosis: clinical and laboratory.

Details of new outbreaks:

First administrative division (territory)	Lower administrative division (district)	Type of epidemiological unit	Total number of outbreaks	Date of start of the outbreak	Species	Number of animals in the outbreaks				
						susceptible	cases	deaths	destroyed	slaughtered
Khabarovsk	Bikin	village	2	around 15 Aug. 2005	bov	231	103	0	138	0
Khabarovsk	Viazemsky	village	2		bov	298	74	0	56	0
Primorskiy	Khanka	village	8		bov	...	805	0	516	0
Primorskiy	Khasan	village								
Primorskiy	Khorol	village								
Primorskiy	Kirovsky	village								
Primorskiy	Mikhailovka	village								
Primorskiy	Pozharskoye	village								
Primorskiy	Spassk	village								

The Territories of Khabarovsk and Primorsk are located in the eastern part of the country. The affected districts border the People's Republic of China.

Description of affected population: animals of different ages have been affected. The animals had not been vaccinated against FMD virus serotype Asia1.

Diagnosis:

Laboratory where diagnosis was made	Diagnostic tests used	Results/Dates
Federal Governmental Institution – Federal Centre for Animal Health (FGI ARRIAH), Vladimir (OIE Regional Reference Laboratory for FMD)	- complement fixation test; - ELISA ⁽¹⁾ ; - PCR ⁽²⁾ ; - virus isolation using cell culture.	Test results were positive: - for samples from Khabarovsk Territory: on 21 August (Bikin district) and 28 August 2005 (Vyazemsky district); - for samples from Primorsky Territory: on 28 August 2005.

Source of outbreaks or origin of infection: under investigation.

Control measures:

- stamping out;
- quarantine;
- movement control inside the country;
- screening;
- zoning;
- vaccination;
- disinfection.

Treatment of affected animals: no.

(1) ELISA: enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay
(2) PCR: polymerase chain reaction

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**NEWCASTLE DISEASE IN ISRAEL
Follow-up report No. 3 (final report)**

Information received on 11 September 2005 from Dr Moshe Chaimovitz, Director of Veterinary and Animal Health Services, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Beit-Dagan:

End of previous report period: 28 August 2005 (see *Disease Information*, **18** [35], 286, dated 2 September 2005).

End of this report period: 8 September 2005.

No further suspected cases have been reported.

The outbreak in Bet Halewi, HaSharon district, is considered closed.

Protection measures and movement restrictions have been lifted. All poultry holdings in the three villages within a radius of 3 km (surveillance zone) of the outbreak were checked serologically and/or clinically and were found to be negative for Newcastle disease.

No cases were detected in any poultry or in any other avian species within a radius of 10 km, namely the area in which an immediate booster vaccination was performed.

VESICULAR STOMATITIS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Follow-up report No. 16

Information received on 13 and 14 September 2005 from Dr Peter Fernandez, Associate Administrator, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Washington, DC:

End of previous report period: 28 August 2005 (see *Disease Information*, **18** [35], 287, dated 2 September 2005).

End of this report period: 11 September 2005.

Precise identification of agent: vesicular stomatitis virus type New Jersey.

Date of first confirmation of the event: 27 April 2005.

Date of start of the event: 16 April 2005.

New outbreaks:

First administrative division (State)	Lower administrative division (County)	Type of epidemiological unit	Name of the location	Date of start of the outbreak	Species	Number of animals in the outbreaks				
						susceptible	cases	deaths	destroyed	slaughtered
Colorado	Delta	f	Paonia	15 Aug 2005	equ	35	1	0	0	0
Colorado	Delta	f	Paonia	27 Aug 2005	equ	3	1	0	0	0
Colorado	Mesa	f	Palisade	14 Aug 2005	equ	5	1	0	0	0
Colorado	Mesa	f	Loma	20 Aug 2005	equ	5	1	0	0	0
Colorado	Mesa	f	Clifton	24 Aug 2005	bov	2	1	0	0	0
Colorado	Moffatt	f	Maybell	29 Aug 2005	bov	200	1	0	0	0
Colorado	Montezuma	f	Cortez	29 Aug 2005	equ	13	1	0	0	0
					bov	2	0	0	0	0
					cap	2	0	0	0	0
Colorado	Montezuma	f	Dolores	30 Aug 2005	equ	19	1	0	0	0
					cap	2	0	0	0	0
Colorado	Montrose	f	Montrose	16 Aug 2005	equ	4	1	0	0	0
Colorado	Montrose	f	Montrose	27 Aug 2005	equ	1	0	0	0	0
					bov	70	3	0	0	0
Colorado	Ouray	f	Ridgeway	29 Aug 2005	equ	30	2	0	0	0
					bov	800	0	0	0	0
Colorado	Rio Blanco	f	Meeker	14 Aug 2005	equ	3	2	0	0	0
Colorado	Rio Blanco	f	Rangely	10 Aug 2005	bov	25	1	0	0	0
Montana	Carbon	f	Fromberg	20 Aug 2005	equ	2	1	0	0	0
Montana	Carbon	f	Joliet	22 Aug 2005	equ	4	1	0	0	0
					bov	56	0	0	0	0
					ovi	34	0	0	0	0
Montana	Carbon	f	Joliet	26 Aug 2005	equ	2	1	0	0	0
Montana	Rosebud	f	Ashland	12 Aug 2005	equ	11	5	0	0	0
					bov	2	1	0	0	0
					sui	1	0	0	0	0
					cap	1	0	0	0	0
Montana	Stillwater	f	Columbus	25 Aug 2005	equ	11	2	0	0	0
					bov	3	0	0	0	0
					ovi	200	0	0	0	0
Montana	Stillwater	f	Park City	26 Aug 2005	bov	56	4	0	0	0
Montana	Yellowstone	f	Billings	15 Aug 2005	equ	5	1	0	0	0
Montana	Yellowstone	f	Billings	16 Aug 2005	equ	4	1	0	0	0

First administrative division (State)	Lower administrative division (County)	Type of epidemiological unit	Name of the location	Date of start of the outbreak	Species	Number of animals in the outbreaks				
						susceptible	cases	deaths	destroyed	slaughtered
Montana	Yellowstone	f	Billings	21 Aug 2005	bov	160	1	0	0	0
Montana	Yellowstone	f	Billings	22 Aug 2005	equ	7	5	0	0	0
Montana	Yellowstone	f	Huntley	26 Aug 2005	equ	6	5	0	0	0
					bov	56	4	0	0	0
Montana	Yellowstone	f	Laurel	15 Aug 2005	equ	11	3	0	0	0
					bov	1	0	0	0	0
Montana	Yellowstone	f	Laurel	16 Aug 2005	equ	8	1	0	0	0
Montana	Yellowstone	f	Laurel	18 Aug 2005	equ	7	7	0	0	0
Montana	Yellowstone	f	Laurel	19 Aug 2005	bov	52	5	0	0	0
Montana	Yellowstone	f	Laurel	20 Aug 2005	equ	5	5	0	0	0
					bov	7	3	0	0	0
Montana	Yellowstone	f	Laurel	22 Aug 2005	equ	5	5	0	0	0
					bov	15	6	0	0	0
Montana	Yellowstone	f	Shepherd	18 Aug 2005	equ	2	1	0	0	0
New Mexico	San Juan	f	Bloomfield	18 Aug 2005	equ	15	1	0	0	0
New Mexico	San Juan	f	Bloomfield	25 Aug 2005	equ	1	1	0	0	0
New Mexico	San Juan	f	Navajo Dam	30 Aug 2005	equ	3	1	0	0	0
Utah	Davis	f	Kaysville	2 Aug 2005	equ	3	1	0	0	0
Utah	Duchesne	f	Upalco	28 Aug 2005	equ	5	2	0	0	0
Utah	Emery	f	Orangeville	23 Aug 2005	bov	97	1	0	0	0
Wyoming	Bighorn	f	Cowley	1 Sept 2005	equ	4	1	0	0	0
Wyoming	Bighorn	f	Greybull	15 Aug 2005	equ	5	4	0	0	0
					cap	1	0	0	0	0
Wyoming	Bighorn	f	Greybull	16 Aug 2005	equ	14	3	0	0	0
					bov	20	0	0	0	0
Wyoming	Bighorn	f	Greybull	23 Aug 2005	equ	3	1	0	0	0
Wyoming	Bighorn	f	Greybull	23 Aug 2005	equ	6	3	0	0	0
Wyoming	Bighorn	f	Greybull	24 Aug 2005	equ	10	3	0	0	0
					bov	30	0	0	0	0
Wyoming	Bighorn	f	Greybull	27 Aug 2005	equ	15	1	0	0	0
Wyoming	Bighorn	f	Greybull	31 Aug 2005	bov	18	1	0	0	0
Wyoming	Converse	f	Glenrock	30 Aug 2005	equ	16	1	0	0	0
					bov	8	0	0	0	0
Wyoming	Fremont	f	Hudson	24 Aug 2005	equ	6	1	0	0	0
					bov	21	0	0	0	0
Wyoming	Fremont	f	Hudson	29 Aug 2005	equ	7	1	0	0	0
Wyoming	Fremont	f	Hudson	30 Aug 2005	equ	7	1	0	0	0
Wyoming	Fremont	f	Lander	26 Aug 2005	equ	3	1	0	0	0
Wyoming	Fremont	f	Riverton	15 Aug 2005	equ	2	1	0	0	0
Wyoming	Fremont	f	Riverton	19 Aug 2005	equ	2	2	0	0	0
Wyoming	Fremont	f	Riverton	21 Aug 2005	equ	3	3	0	0	0
					bov	4	0	0	0	0
Wyoming	Goshen	f	Torrington	19 Aug 2005	equ	5	1	0	0	0
Wyoming	Goshen	f	Torrington	19 Aug 2005	equ	4	0	0	0	0
					bov	35	5	0	0	0
Wyoming	Goshen	f	Torrington	21 Aug 2005	equ	4	1	0	0	0
Wyoming	Goshen	f	Torrington	25 Aug 2005	equ	5	1	0	0	0

First administrative division (State)	Lower administrative division (County)	Type of epidemiological unit	Name of the location	Date of start of the outbreak	Species	Number of animals in the outbreaks				
						susceptible	cases	deaths	destroyed	slaughtered
Wyoming	Hot Springs	f	Thermopolis	24 Aug 2005	equ	3	0	0	0	0
Wyoming	Hot Springs	f	Thermopolis	31 Aug 2005	equ	50	1	0	0	0
					bov	12	0	0	0	0
Wyoming	Hot Springs	f	Thermopolis	2 Sept 2005	equ	7	2	0	0	0
Wyoming	Sublette	f	Boulder	30 Aug 2005	equ	11	1	0	0	0
					bov	10	0	0	0	0
Wyoming	Sweetwater	f	Burnt Fork	21 Aug 2005	equ	4	3	0	0	0
					bov	140	0	0	0	0
Wyoming	Sweetwater	f	Green River	17 Aug 2005	equ	2	1	0	0	0
					bov	207	0	0	0	0
Wyoming	Sweetwater	f	Lander	31 Aug 2005	equ	15	2	0	0	0
Wyoming	Uinta	f	Mountain View	30 Aug 2005	equ	5	0	0	0	0
					bov	34	1	0	0	0
					ovi	15	0	0	0	0
Wyoming	Washakie	f	Worland	21 Aug 2005	equ	11	2	0	0	0
Wyoming	Washakie	f	Worland	21 Aug 2005	equ	1	1	0	0	0
					bov	3	0	0	0	0
Wyoming	Washakie	f	Worland	27 Aug 2005	bov	7	1	0	0	0
Wyoming	Washakie	f	Worland	29 Aug 2005	equ	6	2	0	0	0
Wyoming	Washakie	f	Worland	30 Aug 2005	equ	1	1	0	0	0

f = farm

Diagnosis:

Laboratories where diagnosis was made	Species examined	Diagnostic tests used	Dates	Results
National Veterinary Services Laboratories, Ames, Iowa	equ	virus isolation	26, 29, 30, 31 August, 2 September 2005	positive for virus type New Jersey
	equ/cap	complement fixation test	3, 10 September 2005	positive
Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory, Plum Island, New York	bov	virus isolation	1 September 2005	positive for virus type New Jersey
	bov/ovi	complement fixation test	3, 10 September 2005	positive

Source of outbreaks or origin of infection: unknown or inconclusive (vectors?).

Control measures undertaken:

- control of arthropods;
- quarantine;
- on-going surveillance activities are being performed by APHIS Veterinary Services and Arizona⁽¹⁾, Colorado, Montana, New Mexico, Texas⁽¹⁾, Utah and Wyoming State Departments of Agriculture personnel.

Treatment of affected animals: no.

Vaccination prohibited: yes.

(1) Note: no new vesicular stomatitis-positive premises have been reported in Texas since May 2005 and in Arizona since June 2005.

CLASSICAL SWINE FEVER IN SOUTH AFRICA
Follow-up report No. 3

Information received on 14 September 2005 from Dr Botlhe Modisane, Senior Manager of Animal Health, National Department of Agriculture, Pretoria:

End of previous report period: 15 August 2005 (see *Disease Information*, **18** [33], 270, dated 19 August 2005).

End of this report period: 12 September 2005.

Precise identification of agent: classical swine fever (CSF) virus. The virus isolated is closely related to a Chinese 2.1 isolate found in 1998.

Date of first confirmation of the event: 8 July 2005.

Date of start of the event: 13 June 2005.

Nature of diagnosis: clinical, post-mortem and laboratory.

Details of new outbreaks:

First administrative division (Province)	Lower administrative division	Type of epidemiological unit	Name of the location	Date of start of the outbreak	Species	Number of animals in the outbreak				
						susceptible	cases	deaths	destroyed	slaughtered
Western Cape	Worcester	farm	De Doorns	9 July 2005	sui	181	*	0	181	0
Western Cape	Worcester	farm	Dingley Dell	9 July 2005	sui	20	*	0	20	0
Eastern Cape	Mnquma	village	Kentane	**
Eastern Cape	Buffalo City	village	King Williamstown	**
Eastern Cape	Maiethswa	village	Aliwal North	**
Eastern Cape	Blue Crane Route	village	Cookhouse	**
Eastern Cape	Mbhashe	village	Idutywa	**
Eastern Cape	Lukanji	village	Queenstown	**
Eastern Cape	King Sabata Dalindyeb	village	Umtata	**

* serosurveillance-identified CSF-positive pigs – no clinical signs were observed.

** high mortality.

In Eastern Cape Province, intensive surveillance measures have been put in place in order to immediately detect any possible extension of the epizootic. Kentane in the Mnquma District was identified as the epicentre of an infected area and tracing back and tracing forward resulted in the detection of infected foci: King Williamstown, Queenstown, Cookhouse and Aliwal North and Umtata.

Description of affected population: in Eastern Cape, smallholdings in communal areas are mainly involved, as well as a few commercial farms.

Source of outbreaks or origin of infection: unknown or inconclusive.

Trace-back investigations into the possible origin of the disease in Western Cape Province led to the retesting of duplicate samples from pigs that died on a smallholding in the Worcester area in October 2004. At that time, samples from these animals had tested negative for porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome and African swine fever. The duplicate samples now tested positive for classical swine fever.

Control measures undertaken:

- stamping out and burying of cadavers;
- disinfection of infected premises/establishments; in Western Cape Province, the cleaning and disinfection (on two separate occasions) of all the affected properties have been completed;
- quarantine and movement control inside the country (see below).

Temporary state veterinary movement control measures were instituted for all transport of live pigs and pig carcasses across all provincial boundaries throughout the whole of South Africa.

Due to the highly infectious nature of CSF, South Africa has voluntarily decided to impose an export ban on all pigs and pig products in the interests of protecting its trading partners against this disease. This includes all live pigs, genetic material and pork products, including heat-treated meat. Processed products, such as fully mounted trophies, salted hides, tusks dipped in formalin, that have been suitably treated and disinfected, are excluded from this ban.

Vaccination prohibited: yes.

Other details/comments: an intensive survey throughout the country found no cases of CSF other than in the Western Cape Province and Eastern Cape Province.

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FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION REPORT

Translation of information received on 14 September 2005 from Dr Mabela N'Lemba, Director Head of Department, Directorate for Animal Production and Health (DPASA), Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Livestock, Kinshasa:

Report date: 26 August 2005.

Nature of diagnosis: laboratory.

Outbreaks:

Location	No. of outbreaks
Ruzizi, Uvira	2

Diagnosis:

- A. Laboratory where diagnosis was made:** Onderstepoort Veterinary Institute, South Africa.
- B. Diagnostic tests used:** serological testing was performed in May 2005. Out of 129 bovine sera tested, 97 sera gave positive results.
- C. Causal agent:** foot and mouth disease virus types SAT1, SAT2, SAT3 and A.

Control measures:

- partial stamping out;
- movement control inside the country;
- zoning.

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RINDERPEST IN AFGHANISTAN
THE DELEGATE DECLARES HIS COUNTRY 'PROVISIONALLY FREE FROM RINDERPEST'

Information received on 3 August and 14 September 2005 from Dr Azizullah Osmani, General President of Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Services, Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Food, Kabul:

Report date: 3 August 2005.

The last outbreak of rinderpest in Afghanistan started in September 1995 in Khost Province, close to the border with Pakistan, after having been introduced from a neighbouring country by trade cattle and buffaloes⁽¹⁾. Rinderpest continued to occur in the province, without spreading outside, in 1996 and 1997, when vaccination campaigns and other zoo-sanitary procedures, including animal movement control, brought the disease under control and eliminated the last outbreak from the country.

Clinical cases were confirmed by the examination of samples at the National Agriculture Research Council's ELISA⁽²⁾ laboratory in Islamabad, Pakistan.

Following the occurrence of the disease, the active disease search system was strengthened and has been applied throughout the country since 1997. Focused, randomised serosurveillance exercises were conducted in 1998 and again in 2001; these confirmed the absence of rinderpest disease.

The OIE pathway and guidelines have been strictly followed, including the following:

- Since 1998, no clinical cases of rinderpest have been detected in Afghanistan.
- A new system of disease reporting, involving both public and private veterinarians, has been established.
- The Veterinary Field Unit, comprising over 300 private and public sector veterinarians and para-veterinarians, was directed to be vigilant in searching for clinical signs of rinderpest in cattle and buffaloes and to report any suspected cases to the veterinary authorities immediately.
- The distribution and use of rinderpest vaccine have been strictly prohibited since 1997.

In accordance with the provisions of Appendix 3.8.2. of the *Terrestrial Animal Health Code*, the Delegate declares Afghanistan 'provisionally free from rinderpest'.

(1) See *Disease Information*, **9** (7), 22, dated 23 February 1996, and **9** (20), 66, dated 31 May 1996

(2) ELISA: enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay

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HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA IN THAILAND
Follow-up report No. 68

Information received on 16 September 2005 from Dr Yukol Limlamthong, Director General, Department of Livestock Development, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Bangkok:

End of previous report period: 8 September 2005 (see *Disease Information*, **18** [36], 299, dated 9 September 2005).

End of this report period: 15 September 2005.

Date of first confirmation of the event: 23 January 2004.

Nature of diagnosis: clinical, post-mortem and laboratory.

Details of new outbreaks:

First administrative division (province)	Lower administrative divisions	Type of epidemiological unit	Name of the location	Date of start of the outbreak	Species	Number of animals in the outbreaks				
						susceptible	cases	deaths	destroyed	slaughtered
Kampaengphet	Wangbua, KlongKlung	village	village No. 10	12 Sept. 2005	avi	68	15	15	53	0
Saraburi	PoneTong, NongKae	village	village No. 4	5 Sept. 2005	avi	45	10	10	35	0
Saraburi	PoneTong, NongKae	village	village No. 5	6 Sept. 2005	avi	75	55	55	20	0

Description of affected population in the new outbreaks: native chickens raised in backyards or free ranging with minimal biosecurity.

Diagnosis:

Laboratories where diagnosis was made	Diagnostic tests used	Results
National Institute of Animal Health and Regional Veterinary Research and Development Centres, DLD	- agar-gel precipitation test; - haemagglutination test; - pathogen isolation by egg inoculation; - intracerebral pathogenicity index test.	positive

Source of new outbreaks: unknown or inconclusive.

Control measures undertaken:

- stamping out;
- quarantine;
- movement control inside the country;
- screening;
- zoning;
- disinfection of infected premises/establishments.

Vaccination prohibited: yes.

Other details/comments:

Thailand has been conducting the current nationwide surveillance since 1 July 2005.

In this third wave to date, there have been 36 confirmed outbreaks in 5 provinces, since the second wave of HPAI re-occurrence that occurred from 3 July 2004 - 12 April 2005:

Affected province	No. of outbreaks
Ayudhaya	1
Chainat	1
Kampaengphet	10
Saraburi	5
Suphanburi	19

The five affected provinces are in the Central Poultry Zone of Thailand (see details and map in *Disease Information*, **18** [35], 290-291, dated 2 September 2005).

All cases involved either free-range poultry or poultry raised in farms with traditional husbandry practices with poor sanitation and insufficient biosecurity.

Affected population	No. of outbreaks
native poultry	28
quail	3
fighting cocks	2
laying hens	1
laying ducks	1
broilers	1

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