

Contents

White spot disease in Iran	229
Avian influenza in Kazakhstan	231
Highly pathogenic avian influenza in Indonesia: follow-up report No. 10	232
Vesicular stomatitis in the United States of America: follow-up report No. 12	233
Equine rhinopneumonitis in Israel	235
Newcastle disease in Botswana: follow-up report No. 1	236
Infectious haematopoietic necrosis in Spain: virus detection in a farm	237
Highly pathogenic avian influenza in Russia: follow-up report No. 1	239
Newcastle disease in France: update on the situation as of 3 August 2005	241
<i>Streptococcus suis</i> in the People's Republic of China	245

WHITE SPOT DISEASE IN IRAN

(**Date of previous outbreak of white spot disease in Iran reported to the OIE:** 2003).

IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION REPORT

Information received on 2 August 2005 from Dr Mansour Sayari, Head of Iran Veterinary Organization, Ministry of Jihad-e-Agriculture, Tehran:

Report date: 2 August 2005.

Reason for immediate notification: first occurrence or re-occurrence in a country or zone/compartiment of the country, if the country or zone/compartiment of the country was previously considered to be free of that particular disease.

Affected species: Indian white prawn (*Penaeus indicus*).

Date of first confirmation of the event: 24 June 2005.

Date of start of the event: 23 June 2005.

Nature of diagnosis: clinical diagnosis and advanced laboratory tests.

Details of occurrence:

First administrative division	Lower administrative division	Type of epidemiological unit	Location
Bushehr province, in the southern part of the country	Haleh	coastal area	Persian Gulf coast

Species	Morbidity rate	Mortality rate	Quantity (weight) of animals				
			susceptible	cases	deaths	destroyed	slaughtered
cru	70%	30%	477,120 kg	94,920 kg	51,368 kg	73,640 kg	...

Description of affected population: prawns (shrimp) in semi-closed farming system.

Diagnosis: high mortality was observed in juvenile shrimp on 23 June 2005. Samples were sent to the provincial and national reference laboratories and were tested by the PCR⁽¹⁾ method.

Laboratories where diagnosis was made	Species examined	Number of animals examined	Diagnostic tests used	Date	Results
Bushehr Shrimp Central Laboratory	<i>Penaeus indicus</i>	580	PCR	24 June 2005	positive
Central Veterinary Laboratory of the Iran Veterinary Organization	<i>Penaeus indicus</i>	22	PCR

Source of outbreak or origin of infection: investigations underway.

Control measures undertaken:

- quarantine;
- tracing back;
- surveillance within containment and/or buffer zone;
- surveillance outside containment and/or buffer zone;
- official destruction of clinically diseased aquatic animals;
- official destruction of aquatic animal products;
- official disposal of carcasses, by-products and waste;
- decontamination of premises/disinfection;
- control of vectors;
- control of wildlife reservoirs;
- stamping out;
- zoning;
- within-country movement controls.

Treatment of affected animals: no.

Other details/comments:

- this is the first outbreak of white spot disease confirmed in the Haleh area;
- according to the national surveillance system, no other outbreak of white spot disease has been recorded in other shrimp farming sites, including Hormozgan and Chabahar.

(1) PCR: polymerase chain reaction

AVIAN INFLUENZA IN KAZAKHSTAN

IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION REPORT

Translation of information received on 2 August 2005 from Dr Marat Mynzhanov, Director, Veterinary Surveillance Department, Ministry of Agriculture, Astana:

Report date: 2 August 2005.

Precise identification of agent: influenza virus type A, subtype H5.

Date of first confirmation of the event: 29 July 2005.

Date of start of the event: 22 July 2005.

Nature of diagnosis: clinical and laboratory.

Details of outbreak:

First administrative division	Lower administrative division	Type of epidemiological unit	Name of the location	Species	Number of animals in the outbreak				
					susceptible	cases	deaths	destroyed	slaughtered
Pavlodar region	Irtys	farm	Golubovka	avi	2,800*	...	400	2,400	0

* 2,350 geese and 450 ducks

Diagnosis:

Laboratories where diagnosis was made	Species examined	Diagnostic tests used	Date	Results
Pavlodar region branch of the Kazakhstan National Veterinary Laboratory	avi (geese)	ELISA ⁽¹⁾ (avian influenza virus antibody test kit)	27 July 2005	38/39 positive
Scientific Research Institute for Agriculture	avi (geese)	immunomembrane filter assay to detect influenza A or B antigens	1 Aug. 2005	detection of type A influenza antigen in 20% of suspensions from internal organs of dead birds
		inhibition haemagglutination test (indirect haemagglutination test)	1 Aug. 2005	detection of avian influenza virus type A with the antigenic formula H5 (preliminary diagnosis of avian influenza)

Source of outbreak or origin of infection: contact with wild waterfowl at open water reservoirs.

Control measures undertaken:

- stamping out;
- quarantine;
- movement control inside the country;
- screening;
- disinfection of infected premises/establishment.

Control measures to be undertaken:

- control of wildlife reservoirs;
- zoning.

Vaccination prohibited: yes.

(1) ELISA: enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay

HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA IN INDONESIA
Follow-up report No. 10

Information received on 2 August 2005 from Prof. H.R. Wasito, Director General of Livestock Services, Ministry of Agriculture, Jakarta:

End of previous report period: 23 June 2005 (see *Disease Information*, **18** [26], 180, dated 1 July 2005).

End of this report period: 1 August 2005.

Precise identification of agent : highly pathogenic influenza A virus, subtype H5N1.

News was received of a family cluster of three human patients with pneumonia who presented to healthcare facilities between 24 June and 7 July 2005. All three patients presented similar clinical signs and they all died.

The Directorate General of Livestock Services ordered an immediate investigation aimed at detecting any presence of avian influenza in animals. Purposive sampling was undertaken in the subdistrict where the affected family lived and in two neighbouring subdistricts (i.e. in the subdistricts of Legok, Panongan and Cisauk), in Tangerang district, Banten province, West Java. Investigations were conducted by the Research Institute for Veterinary Science, Bogor.

Summary of investigations carried out in Tangerang district:

Sampling		Diagnostic testing	
Location	Animals sampled	Tests used	Results
Babat village, Legok subdistrict	pigs (26 nasal swabs)	PCR ⁽¹⁾	negative
	ducks (15 cloacal swabs)	PCR	positive
	ducks (5 sera)	antibody detection	negative
Ranca luh village, Panongan subdistrict	pigs (10 nasal swabs)	PCR	positive
	ducks (10 cloacal swabs)	PCR	positive
	ducks/geese/chickens (30 sera)	antibody detection	10/30 positive
	pigs restocked three months ago (16 nasal swabs)	PCR	negative
In and around the victims' house	birds (2 faecal samples)	PCR	1/2 positive
	chickens (3 sera)	serology	negative
Dandang village, Cisauk subdistrict (5 km from the victims' house)	chickens (2 nasal swabs)	PCR	negative
	chicken (1 serum)	haemagglutination inhibition test	negative

Control measures undertaken:

- partial stamping out; on 24 June 2005 stamping out was applied in Babat village, Legok subdistrict, to 32 pigs (20 adults and 12 piglets) and 192 muscovies/ducks;
- quarantine;
- movement control inside the country;
- disinfection of infected premises/establishments.

Other details/comments:

- There had not been any outbreaks of avian influenza with clinical signs in Tangerang district since April 2005 (see Follow-up report No. 8, *Disease Information*, **18** [21], 137, dated 27 May 2005).
- Samples taken from the human victims were sent by the Ministry of Human Health to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, United States of America (one of the four WHO⁽²⁾ Reference Centres for influenza)⁽³⁾.

- (1) PCR: polymerase chain reaction
- (2) WHO: World Health Organization
- (3) Additional information on the human cases of avian influenza in Indonesia is available on the WHO website at www.who.int/csr/don/en/index.html

*
* *

VESICULAR STOMATITIS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Follow-up report No. 12

Information received on 3 August 2005 from Dr Peter Fernandez, Associate Administrator, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Washington, DC:

End of previous report period: 24 July 2005 (see *Disease Information*, **18** [30], 215, dated 29 July 2005).

End of this report period: 31 July 2005.

Precise identification of agent: vesicular stomatitis virus type New Jersey.

Date of first confirmation of the event: 27 April 2005.

Date of start of the event: 16 April 2005.

New outbreaks:

First administrative division (State)	Lower administrative division (County)	Type of epidemiological unit	Name of the location	Date of start of the outbreak	Species	Number of animals in the outbreaks				
						susceptible	cases	deaths	destroyed	slaughtered
Colorado	Mesa	f	Junction	9 July 2005	equ	2	2	0	0	0
Colorado	La Plata	f	Durango	12 July 2005	equ	2	1	0	0	0
Colorado	La Plata	f	Bayfield	14 July 2005	equ	72	1	0	0	0
Colorado	Mesa	f	Loma	16 July 2005	bov	10	3	0	0	0
Colorado	Rio Blanco	f	Rangely	11 July 2005	equ	4	1	0	0	0
Colorado	Mesa	f	Mesa	13 July 2005	bov	120	5	0	0	0
New Mexico	Bernalillo	f	Albuquerque	16 July 2005	equ	1	1	0	0	0
Utah	Uintah	f	Jensen	11 July 2005	equ	32	3	0	0	0
Utah	Uintah	f	Vernal	15 July 2005	equ	10	4	0	0	0
Utah	Uintah	f	Vernal	15 July 2005	equ	29	3	0	0	0
Utah	Salt Lake	f	Bluffdale	15 July 2005	equ	2	1	0	0	0
Utah	Carbon	f	Price	17 July 2005	equ	8	1	0	0	0
					bov	7	0	0	0	0
Utah	Uintah	f	Vernal	15 July 2005	equ	4	3	0	0	0
Utah	Salt Lake	f	Bluffdale	15 July 2005	equ	4	1	0	0	0
Utah	Beaver	f	Greenville	16 July 2005	equ	2	1	0	0	0
Utah	Uintah	f	Vernal	15 July 2005	equ	7	1	0	0	0
Utah	Uintah	f	Vernal	15 July 2005	equ	2	2	0	0	0
Utah	Uintah	f	Whiterocks	18 July 2005	bov	37	1	0	0	0
Utah	Grand	f	Moab	15 July 2005	equ	2	1	0	0	0
Utah	Uintah	f	Vernal	17 July 2005	bov	61	2	0	0	0

First administrative division (State)	Lower administrative division (County)	Type of epidemiological unit	Name of the location	Date of start of the outbreak	Species	Number of animals in the outbreaks				
						susceptible	cases	deaths	destroyed	slaughtered
Utah	Uintah	f	Vernal	17 July 2005	equ	5	2	0	0	0
					bov	2	0	0	0	0
Utah	Uintah	f	Vernal	18 July 2005	equ	2	1	0	0	0
					bov	10	1	0	0	0
Utah	Grand	f	Moab	18 July 2005	equ	10	1	0	0	0
Utah	Grand	f	Green River	18 July 2005	equ	3	0	0	0	0
					bov	22	1	0	0	0
Utah	Uintah	f	Vernal	17 July 2005	equ	1	1	0	0	0
Utah	Uintah	f	Vernal	20 July 2005	equ	1	1	0	0	0
Utah	Duchesne	f	Home	21 July 2005	equ	2	1	0	0	0
Utah	Uintah	f	Neola	22 July 2005	equ	7	1	0	0	0

f = farm

Diagnosis:

Laboratories where diagnosis was made	Species examined	Diagnostic tests used	Dates	Results
National Veterinary Services Laboratories, Ames, Iowa	equ	virus isolation	26 July 2005	positive
		complement fixation test	30 July 2005	
Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory, Plum Island, New York	bov	virus isolation	27 July 2005	
		complement fixation test	30 July 2005	

Source of outbreaks or origin of infection: unknown or inconclusive (vectors?).

Control measures undertaken:

- control of arthropods;
- quarantine;
- on-going surveillance activities are being performed by APHIS Veterinary Services and Arizona⁽¹⁾, Colorado, New Mexico, Texas⁽¹⁾ and Utah State Departments of Agriculture personnel.

Treatment of affected animals: no.

Vaccination prohibited: yes.

(1) Note: no new vesicular stomatitis-positive premises have been reported in Texas since May 2005 and in Arizona since June 2005.

EQUINE RHINOPNEUMONITIS IN ISRAEL

(Disease never reported before in Israel).

IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION REPORT

Information received on 3 August 2005 from Dr Moshe Chaimovitz, Director of Veterinary and Animal Health Services, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Beit-Dagan:

Report date: 31 July 2005.

Reason for immediate notification: first occurrence of a listed disease in a country.

Date of first confirmation of the event: 21 July 2005.

Date of start of the event: 27 June 2005.

Nature of diagnosis: clinical and laboratory.

Details of outbreak:

First administrative division	Lower administrative division	Type of epidemiological unit	Name of the location	Species	Number of animals in the outbreak				
					susceptible	cases	deaths	destroyed	slaughtered
HaDarom (Southern) region	Ashqelon district	farm	Be'er Toviyya	equ	20	4	0	0	0

Description of affected population: horses in a riding and breeding stable. Horses are kept in the premises and are not mixed with other horses. In some cases horses are moved to exhibitions and for breeding and training reasons.

Diagnosis:

Laboratories where diagnosis was made	Diagnostic tests used	Dates	Results
Kimron Veterinary Institute, Beit-Dagan	virus neutralisation test based on seroconversion	27 June and 21 July 2005	positive

Source of outbreak or origin of infection: under investigation.

Control measures undertaken:

- quarantine;
- clinical and serological screening of all stables within a radius of 3 km is being conducted.

Vaccination prohibited: yes.

*
* *

**NEWCASTLE DISEASE IN BOTSWANA
Follow-up report No. 1**

Information received on 4 August 2005 from Dr Musa Fanikiso, Director of Animal Health and Production, Ministry of Agriculture, Gaborone:

End of previous report period: 20 July 2005 (see *Disease Information*, **18** [29], 209, dated 22 July 2005).

End of this report period: 4 August 2005.

Date of first confirmation of the event: 15 July 2005.

Date of start of the event: 7 July 2005.

After the report of a Newcastle disease (ND) outbreak in Woodhall 2, Lobatse district (see Immediate notification report), an outbreak occurred in Mochudi district (about 70 km away). There is, however, no evidence to suggest direct spread from the outbreak in Lobatse.

Details of new outbreak:

First administrative division	Lower administrative division	Type of epidemiological unit	Name of the location	Species	Number of animals in the outbreak				
					susceptible	cases	deaths	destroyed	slaughtered
South Eastern region	Mochudi district	village	Boseja ward of Mochudi village	avi	550	382	358	20	0

Description of affected population: backyard chickens of all ages and both sexes.

Diagnosis of the new outbreak: the disease was initially suspected following clinical signs of dullness, greenish diarrhoea followed by death (100% mortality) in 11 of 17 homesteads/households rearing backyard chickens in Boseja ward.

Laboratory where diagnosis was made	Diagnostic tests used	Date	Results
National Veterinary Laboratory, Gaborone	haemagglutination test	1 Aug. 2005	titres: 1:64
	haemagglutination inhibition test	1 Aug. 2005	titres: 1:128

Source of outbreak or origin of infection: unknown or inconclusive.

Control measures

A. Lobatse outbreak:

- Movement restrictions into and out of Woodhall 2 (affected area) are still in place.
- Supervision of cleaning and disinfection of infected premises was undertaken.
- Vaccination: 28,000 doses of ND vaccine have been sold to date; 200 chickens in seven households closest to the outbreak were vaccinated immediately, under official veterinary supervision, using lyophilized (freeze-dried) live vaccine.
- Public awareness campaigns through the media and direct extension are continuing.
- Screening: ND surveillance is also being undertaken in the only ostrich farm in the controlled area; so far, 55 sera have been collected from ostriches for this purpose. There has been no evidence of the disease in this species.

B. Mochudi outbreak:

- Movement restrictions into and out of Mochudi village have been imposed until further notice.
- Disinfection of infected premises.
- Prophylactic vaccination of poultry was advised and farmers are administering it with the assistance of extension staff. About 100,000 doses of ND vaccine have been sold by the Departmental vaccine outlet points (Livestock Advisory Centre) in Mochudi. More vaccine is being procured to arrest the spread.

- A total of 619 chickens were vaccinated immediately under official veterinary supervision.
- Intense public awareness efforts are being undertaken to inform farmers and the public about the disease and the current control measures.
- Investigations to determine the extent of the outbreak are continuing.

Other details/comments:

- Backyard chickens are not vaccinated against ND by their owners as routinely as commercial birds and, as a result, backyard chickens are usually the only ones affected by outbreaks.
- The national ostrich flock is free from ND. The country has a biannual ND (and avian influenza) surveillance campaign in ostriches.
- ND vaccination is prohibited for ostriches.

*
* *

INFECTIOUS HAEMATOPOIETIC NECROSIS IN SPAIN
Virus detection in a farm

(Infection never reported before in Spain).

IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION REPORT

Translation of information received on 4 August 2005 from Dr Arnaldo Cabello Navarro, Deputy Director General of Animal Health, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Madrid

Report date: 4 August 2005.

Reason for immediate notification: first occurrence in a country, if the country was previously considered to be free of that particular disease.

Affected species: rainbow trout (*Oncorhynchus mykiss*).

Date of first confirmation of the event: 27 July 2005.

Clinical disease: no. There have been no clinical signs or deaths associated with the event.

Nature of diagnosis: advanced laboratory tests.

Details of occurrence:

First administrative division	Lower administrative division	Type of epidemiological unit	Location
Andalusia Autonomous Community	Granada province, Loja district	farm	Riofrio farm, located on Rio Frio river, in the Genil River basin

Description of affected population: the farm contains 9,000 rainbow trout in freshwater in a semi-closed farming system. There are also sturgeons in ponds on the same farm.

Diagnosis:

Laboratories where diagnosis was made	Species examined	Number of animals examined	Diagnostic tests used	Date	Results
Central Veterinary Laboratory	<i>O. mykiss</i>	150 (in 15 pools of 10 fish each)	viral isolation on cell culture	27 July 2005	1 pool positive
			PCR ⁽¹⁾	27 July 2005	the pool in which the virus was isolated and two other pools were positive

Additional samples were taken (test results are pending).

Source of outbreak or origin of infection: unknown or inconclusive.

Control measures undertaken:

- quarantine;
- tracing forward;
- tracing back;
- surveillance within containment and/or buffer zone;
- surveillance outside containment and/or buffer zone;
- zoning;
- within-country movement controls.

Treatment of affected animals: no.

Vaccination prohibited: yes.

Other details/comments: the preliminary epidemiological investigations did not reveal any fish movements from this farm to other fish farms.

(1) PCR: polymerase chain reaction

*
* *

HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA IN RUSSIA
Follow-up report No. 1

Information received on 5 August 2005 from Dr Evgueny A. Nepoklonov, Head of the Main Veterinary Department, Ministry of Agriculture and Food, Moscow:

End of previous report period: 24 July 2005 (see *Disease Information*, **18** [30], 218, dated 29 July 2005).

End of this report period: 5 August 2005.

Precise identification of agent: influenza virus type A, subtype H5N1. An isolate from the village of Suzdalka has been subjected to an in-depth examination. The preliminary results of sequencing show that the isolate can be considered highly pathogenic.

Date of first confirmation of the event: 23 July 2005.

Date of start of the event: 18 July 2005.

Nature of diagnosis: clinical, post-mortem and laboratory.

Details of outbreaks:

First administrative division (region)	Lower administrative division (district)	Type of epidemiological unit	Name of the location	Date of start of the outbreak	Species	Number of animals in the outbreaks				
						susceptible	cases	deaths	destroyed	slaughtered
Novosibirsk (Novosibirskaya oblast)	Kupino	village	...	18 July 2005	avi
	Dovolnoye	village	...	22 July 2005	avi
	Chistoozernoye	village	...	22 July 2005	avi

Description of affected populations: chickens, turkeys, ducks and geese in backyard holdings.

The disease has been reported in a total of 13 villages:

In 5 villages, birds have shown clinical signs of the disease and deaths have been reported; birds have tested positive to antibodies to H5 and the virus has been isolated.

In 4 villages, no deaths have been reported, but birds have tested positive for antibodies to H5 and the virus has been isolated.

In the remaining 4 villages, no deaths have been reported, nor has the virus been detected in any of the birds. However, birds have tested positive to antibodies to H5.

Diagnosis:

Laboratories where diagnosis was made	Number of animals examined	Diagnostic tests used	Dates	Results
Federal Centre for Animal Health (ARRIAH)	70	ELISA ⁽¹⁾ for antigen detection	23 July - 5 Aug. 2005	positive
All-Russia State Research Institute for Control, Standardisation and Certification of Veterinary Preparations	5	PCR ⁽²⁾ (M-protein gene)	23 July - 5 Aug. 2005	positive
Association for Scientific Production 'NPO Vektor'	62	haemagglutination test	23 July - 5 Aug. 2005	positive
Novosibirsk inter-regional veterinary laboratory, Federal Governmental University	5,324	ELISA ⁽¹⁾ for antibody detection	28 July 2005	positive

Source of outbreaks or origin of infection: the epidemiological analysis has shown that the disease started in poultry in contact with wild waterfowl at open water reservoirs. Waterfowl are considered the primary source of the virus. In addition, there are reports of the disease in wild birds. Infection of

domestic birds in all the affected localities, some of which are up to 600 km apart, occurred simultaneously. In all cases, the source of infection was wild waterfowl in lakes frequented by domestic birds.

Control measures undertaken:

- Stamping out: stamping out of birds suspected of being infected has begun. In all three affected districts a total of 18,513 domestic birds of five species have been destroyed.
- Quarantine.
- Movement control inside the country.
- Screening: all localities in Novosibirsk region are being screened for circulation of the virus and presence of seropositive birds.
- Zoning.
- Disinfection of infected premises/establishments.

Vaccination prohibited: yes.

Other details/comments:

- No signs of the disease have appeared in commercial poultry farms in the region. Monitoring of all 14 commercial poultry farms did not reveal any circulation of the virus or seropositive birds.
- In localities where the infection has resulted in deaths of birds, mortality since the beginning of the epizootic has not exceeded 3.3%.
- The application of control measures has sharply reduced mortality. There are no longer any deaths accompanied by characteristic clinical signs among domestic birds, and total daily mortality in the different localities is only some thousandths of the total flock.

(1) ELISA: enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay

(2) PCR: polymerase chain reaction

*
* *

NEWCASTLE DISEASE IN FRANCE

Update on the situation as of 3 August 2005

Information received on 5 August 2005 from Dr Monique Eloit, Deputy Director General, General Directorate for Food (DGAL), Ministry of Agriculture, Food, Fisheries and Rural Affairs, Paris:

End of previous report period: 27 July 2005 (see *Disease Information*, **18** [30], 223, dated 29 July 2005).

End of this report period: 3 August 2005.

1. Initial detection of disease

On 15 July 2005, the French authorities were informed by the British authorities of a confirmed outbreak of Newcastle disease (ND) on a pheasant farm in Surrey, England. The French authorities immediately launched an epidemiological investigation to determine whether French farms could be at risk.

The results of this investigation revealed that five farms located in two French *départements* – one in Loire-Atlantique and four in Vendée – had supplied the affected English farm with pheasants in three consignments between 21 June and 5 July 2005. The five farms were immediately blocked and placed under surveillance.

Also on 15 July 2005, veterinary inspections as well as serological and virological sampling were conducted on these farms.

These veterinary inspections did not reveal any clinical signs at the Vendée farms or in the area surrounding the Loire-Atlantique farm. However, some mild and nonspecific clinical signs were observed in a small number of animals at the suspect farm, where only pheasants and partridges are bred.

Alongside these tests, the relevant national laboratory (AFSSA⁽¹⁾ Ploufragan) carried out molecular sequencing of fragments of genetic material, which revealed that the protein sequence for fusion site F and surrounding the cleavage site is RRQRRF, indicating a virulent strain of avian paramyxovirus 1. These laboratory results led the French authorities to notify the European Commission and the OIE of an ND outbreak at the Loire-Atlantique farm. The sequence identified is very similar to viruses of the phylogenetic line of the 5b group.

Meanwhile, the European Union Reference Laboratory for ND (Weybridge, United Kingdom) identified the strain isolated at the English farm on 15 July as NDV/turkey/Finland/2004.

Finally, on 29 July, an analysis of 218 nucleotides by the same laboratory revealed that the molecular sequence detected in the Loire-Atlantique outbreak is identical to the virus isolated in the United Kingdom.

2. Chronology

Date	Series of events and analyses
20 June	3,500 young pheasants from two farms in the Vendée <i>département</i> were sent to Surrey, in the south of England.
22 June	2,500 young pheasants from a farm in the Loire-Atlantique <i>département</i> were sent to Surrey.
4 July	2,700 young pheasants from two farms in the Vendée <i>département</i> were sent to Surrey.
15 July	British authorities issued information on the suspected ND occurrence in the United Kingdom and its epidemiological link to France.
15 July	The five implicated Vendée and Loire-Atlantique farms were blocked and placed under surveillance.
15 July	In the farms involved, veterinary inspections and sampling for serological and virological testing.

Date	Series of events and analyses
18 July (evening)	Positive serological results for the Loire-Atlantique farm (negative for the other farms).
19 July	Notification to the OIE: suspicion of ND. Situation presented to the European Commission and Member States of the European Union. No special Community safeguard measure was deemed necessary.
20 and 21 July	Preventive culling of 55,000 animals on the Loire-Atlantique farm.
21 July	First intermediate result of the virological analysis was negative for the Loire-Atlantique farm.
22 July	First virological results were negative for the Vendée farms.
26 July (evening)	Molecular sequencing: identification of a virulent sequence (APMV1).
27 July	Notification to the OIE and the European Commission of an ND outbreak.
29 July	An analysis of 218 nucleotides revealed that the molecular sequence of the virus responsible for the Loire-Atlantique outbreak is identical to the virus isolated in the United Kingdom.
1 August	The final result of the virological analysis for the Loire-Atlantique farm was negative after three successive passages in tissue culture.
1 August	Final virological results were negative for the four Vendée farms.

3. Measures taken in France

- 3.1. The five farms involved were blocked and placed under surveillance as from 15 July. For the four Vendée farms, this restriction was lifted on 26 July following negative serological and virological results and in the absence of clinical signs. The restriction remains in effect at the Loire-Atlantique farm.
- 3.2. Following positive serological results and as a preventive measure, the Loire-Atlantique farm's 55,000 animals, located on two sites, were culled on 20 and 21 July. Disinfection was carried out from 22 to 25 July.
- 3.3. All farms belonging to the same poultry cooperative company were placed under official control, along with the 19 farms located within a 3-km radius of the affected farm (the protection zone) and the 59 farms within a 10-km radius (the surveillance zone). In the protection zone, poultry farms are blocked and must undergo veterinary inspections and serological tests. In the surveillance zone, only restriction of animal movement is applied. These measures had largely been implemented as a precautionary step since 15 July.

4. Control of intra-Community trade and exports

As concerns the movement of poultry products defined by Article 2.7.13.4. of the *Terrestrial Animal Health Code*, even before the French outbreak in the Loire-Atlantique *département* was confirmed and in accordance with the European Commission, France opted as soon as the suspicion was raised and as a precautionary measure to suspend certification for the export of poultry products from all regions of France and all intra-Community trade in live birds and hatching eggs from the Loire-Atlantique *département*. Beginning on 21 July, exports from all areas with the exception of the Loire-Atlantique *département* to third countries were reauthorized, depending on country-specific requirements.

- 4.1. Intra-Community trade: As of 4 August, with the exception of pheasants, partridges, and quails (live animals and hatching eggs) from the Loire-Atlantique *département* which, as a precautionary measure, are still subject to the measures applied on 21 July 2005, intra-Community trade is no longer restricted unless it originates within a 10-kilometer radius of the infected Loire-Atlantique farm, where it is still suspended in accordance with the regulations. This decision was reached in agreement with the European Commission.
- 4.2. Exports to third countries: With the exception of pheasants, partridges, and quails from the Loire-Atlantique *département*, which are still subject to the measures applied on 21 July 2005, and in response to favourable developments, certification for the export of French

poultry products to third countries may resume as usual, beginning on 4 August, depending on the requirements of the destination countries. This decision was reached in agreement with the European Commission. Only the export of poultry products from within a 10-km radius of the infected Loire-Atlantique farm to all countries remains prohibited.

5. Epidemiological investigation

5.1. Possible sources of infection

The precise source of the disease is unknown at this stage but the link with avifauna cannot be ruled out given the suspect farm's close proximity to a lake known for its migratory bird population. This is the most likely hypothesis, but all potentially infectious epidemiological contacts must be considered, in particular the movement of humans, equipment, and vehicles.

Moreover, an analysis of 218 nucleotides revealed that the molecular sequence detected in the Loire-Atlantique outbreak is identical to the virus isolated in the United Kingdom.

The epidemiological investigation is nevertheless ongoing.

5.2. Potential risks of spreading

The Loire-Atlantique farm is located in an area where mainly game is bred; there is no nearby large-scale domestic poultry farm, hatchery, or breeder. This farm comprises two sites. On 15 June, 380 pheasants were transferred from the main site to the secondary site. Serological tests carried out during the culling of the animals on 20 and 21 July clearly determined that the birds transferred on 15 June were serologically negative. None of the animals at the secondary site showed any clinical signs up until their preventive culling. This unmistakably demonstrates that viral circulation could not have taken place before 15 June 2005. Given this information, the risk period was between 15 June and 15 July.

No animal has left the affected farm for any location in France, the European Union or any other country since 1 June, with the exception of the 22 June shipment to the United Kingdom, which implies a safety margin since the risk period falls between 15 June and 15 July.

In addition, all farms under surveillance have been blocked. No poultry products may leave them as long as surveillance measures remain in place.

The 3-km protection zone contains 19 farms, which are currently undergoing veterinary inspections and serological sampling. The 10-km surveillance zone contains 59 farms. No clinical signs of ND have been detected. To date, several positive serological analysis results have been obtained at two farms located in the restricted perimeter surrounding the infected farm; no clinical signs were found. The corresponding virological analyses are now underway, and the first intermediate results have been negative.

Because breeders and veterinarians are particularly vigilant at the moment, seven clinical suspicions of ND with no relation to the Loire-Atlantique farm were declared to the official veterinary authorities. The results of the serological and virological analyses carried out thus far have been favourable.

5.3. Summary of the situation

Although the ND outbreak in France was confirmed on 27 July, all protective and control measures had been pre-emptively put in place as of 15 July. Moreover, an epidemiological investigation determined that no potentially infected poultry product was exported or traded, even considering an extended security period starting 1 June, as the potential risk period falls between 15 June and 15 July.

As of 4 August, limits on movements only apply to the area within the restricted perimeter surrounding the infected farm, where the animals were culled on 20 and 21 July, and to game bird farms in the Loire-Atlantique *département*.

(1) AFSSA: *Agence française de sécurité sanitaire des aliments* (French Agency for Food Safety)

Newcastle disease in France Correction

The French authorities have informed the OIE that the first administrative division in France is the **département** (and not the region), since the official veterinary organisation of the country is based on the existing 100 départements. Consequently, the following corrections have been made to Disease Information, **18** (29), 205, dated 22 July 2005 and **18** (30), 223, dated 29 July 2005.

The following information should be taken into account:

First administrative division (département)	Lower administrative division (municipality)	Type of epidemiological unit	Species	Number of animals in the outbreak				
				susceptible	cases	deaths	destroyed	slaughtered
Loire-Atlantique	St-Mars-de-Coutais	farm	avi	approx. 55,000*	approx. 55,000*	...

* approximately 35,000 partridges and 20,000 pheasants

*
* *

STREPTOCOCCUS SUIS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION REPORT

Information received on 5 August 2005 from Mr Jia Youling, Director General, Veterinary Bureau, Ministry of Agriculture, Beijing:

Report date: 5 August 2005.

Reason for immediate notification: an emerging disease with significant morbidity or mortality, or zoonotic potential (though this is not a disease notifiable to the OIE).

Precise identification of agent: *Streptococcus suis* B.

Date of first confirmation of the event: 25 July 2005.

Date of start of the event: 25 June 2005.

Nature of diagnosis: clinical, post-mortem and laboratory.

Details of outbreaks:

First administrative division (province)	Lower administrative division (city)	Type of epidemiological unit	Date of start of the outbreak	Species	Number of animals in the outbreaks				
					susceptible	cases	deaths	destroyed	slaughtered
Sichuan	Chengdu	...	2 Aug. 2005	sui	19	15	1	19	0
Sichuan	Deyang	...	29 July 2005	sui	66	5	5	66	0
Sichuan	Luzhou	...	12 July 2005	sui	7	2	2	7	0
Sichuan	Mianyang	...	24 July 2005	sui	1	1	1	1	0
Sichuan	Nanchong	...	29 July 2005	sui	2	2	2	2	0
Sichuan	Neijiang	...	15 July 2005	sui	3,159	193	0	3,159	0
Sichuan	Zigong	...	17 July 2005	sui	583	9	7	583	0
Sichuan	Ziyang	...	25 June 2005	sui	2,899	414	301	2,899	0

Description of affected population: all infected pigs are in backyard farms.

Diagnosis:

Laboratories where diagnosis was made	Diagnostic tests used	Date	Results
Sichuan Province General Station of Animal Epidemics Prevention and Surveillance, Sichuan	isolation and culture of bacterium	...	positive
Foreign Animal Disease Diagnosis Centre, National Animal Quarantine Institute, Qingdao	microscopy	...	positive
	fluorescent antibody test	...	positive
Harbin Veterinary Research Institute, Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences, Harbin	PCR ⁽¹⁾	25 July 2005	positive
	sequencing	...	the pathogen, <i>Streptococcus suis</i> B, shares 98% nucleotide homology with the CPS2 gene of AF118389 strain of the GenBank databank

Note : The Foreign Animal Disease Diagnosis Centre and the Harbin Veterinary Research Institute carried out a differential diagnosis. Using RT-PCR⁽²⁾ with type A influenza virus as positive control and RT-PCR⁽²⁾ for Nipah virus, the results were negative. The results of pathogen isolation by SPF egg inoculation and pathogen isolation on VERO cell line, after two passages, were also negative. Avian influenza and Nipah disease were, therefore, excluded.

Source of outbreaks or origin of infection: unknown or inconclusive.

Control measures

A. Undertaken:

- Stamping out.
- Quarantine (lifting of quarantine: 14 days after the last pig was culled).
- Movement control inside the country.
- Screening.
- Zoning. Premises with infected pigs or relevant slaughterhouses and other facilities are considered as infected points; areas within a 1-km radius are considered as infected zones; areas within 3 km around the infected zones are considered as buffer zones.
- Disinfection of infected premises/establishments.
- Dipping/spraying.
- Sichuan province has organised a general survey for 51,880,300 live pigs (87.92% of the pig population in the province).

B. To be undertaken: vaccination. An inactivated *Streptococcus suis* vaccine is being tested in the field. All pigs in the infected zones and buffer zones will be vaccinated if the experiment is successful.

Treatment of affected animals: no.

- (1) PCR: polymerase chain reaction
(2) RT-PCR: reverse transcriptase – polymerase chain reaction

*
* *

All OIE (World Organisation for Animal Health) publications are protected by international copyright law. Extracts may be copied, reproduced, translated, adapted or published in journals, documents, books, electronic media and any other medium destined for the public, for information, educational or commercial purposes, provided prior written permission has been granted by the OIE.

The designations and denominations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the OIE concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers and boundaries.

The views expressed in signed articles are solely the responsibility of the authors. The mention of specific companies or products of manufacturers, whether or not these have been patented, does not imply that these have been endorsed or recommended by the OIE in preference to others of a similar nature that are not mentioned.