

29 July 2005

Vol. 18 – No. 30

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BLUETONGUE IN SPAIN Virus detection in cattle

(**Date of previous outbreak of bluetongue in Spain reported to the OIE:** December 2004 [clinical outbreak]).

IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION REPORT

Translation of information received on 22 and 27 July 2005 from Dr Arnaldo Cabello Navarro, Deputy Director General of Animal Health, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Madrid:

Report date: 22 July 2005.

Reason for immediate notification: re-occurrence of a listed infection in the country.

Date of first confirmation of the event: 21 July 2005.

Date of start of the event: 18 July 2005.

Clinical disease: no.

Nature of diagnosis: laboratory.

Details of outbreak:

First administrative division (Autonomous Community)	Lower administrative division (province)	Type of epidemiological unit	Name of the location	Species	Number of animals in the outbreak				
					susceptible	cases	deaths	destroyed	slaughtered
Andalusia	Huelva	...	Encinasola	bov	121	47*	0	0	0

* without clinical signs

Diagnosis:

<i>Laboratory where diagnosis was made</i>	<i>Species examined</i>	<i>Diagnostic tests used</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Results</i>
Central Veterinary Laboratory, Algete	bov	RT-PCR ⁽¹⁾	21 July 2005	positive

Origin of infection: unknown.

Control measures: control of arthropods and other measures in accordance with Directive 2000/75/EC of the Council of the European Union, dated 20 November 2000, laying down specific provisions for the control and eradication of bluetongue.

Treatment of affected animals: no.

Vaccination prohibited: no; vaccination requires an authorisation issued by the official Veterinary Services.

Other details/comments: the outbreak was reported within the restriction zone set up following the epizootics of 2004. Sheep in this zone were vaccinated in winter 2004-2005 (i.e. in the absence of vectors) using a live virus vaccine.

(1) RT-PCR: reverse transcriptase – polymerase chain reaction

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**NEWCASTLE DISEASE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM/GREAT BRITAIN
Follow-up report No. 1**

Information received on 29 July 2005 from Dr Debby Reynolds, Director General for Animal Health and Welfare, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), London:

End of previous report period: 15 July 2005 (see *Disease Information*, **18** [29], 203, dated 22 July 2005).

End of this report period: 29 July 2005.

Details of outbreak (updated data):

<i>First administrative division</i>	<i>Lower administrative division</i>	<i>Type of epidemiological unit</i>	<i>Name of the location</i>	<i>Species</i>	<i>Number of animals in the outbreak</i>				
					<i>susceptible</i>	<i>cases</i>	<i>deaths</i>	<i>destroyed</i>	<i>slaughtered</i>
Surrey	West Horsley	farm	West Horsley	avi	approx. 11,000	10,240	0

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**VESICULAR STOMATITIS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Follow-up report No. 11**

Information received on 21 and 27 July 2005 from Dr Peter Fernandez, Associate Administrator, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Washington, DC:

End of previous report period: 10 July 2005 (see *Disease Information*, **18** [28], 200, dated 15 July 2005).

End of this report period: 24 July 2005.

Precise identification of agent: vesicular stomatitis virus type New Jersey.

Date of first confirmation of the event: 27 April 2005.

Date of start of the event: 16 April 2005.

New outbreaks:

First administrative division (State)	Lower administrative division (County)	Type of epidemiological unit	Name of the location	Date of start of the outbreak	Species	Number of animals in the outbreaks				
						susceptible	cases	deaths	destroyed	slaughtered
Arizona	Yavapai	f	Dewey	3 May 2005	equ	7	1	0	0	0
Arizona	Yavapai	f	Wickenburg	12 May 2005	equ	18	1	0	0	0
					bov	14	0	0	0	0
Colorado	Delta	f	Austin	5 July 2005	equ	1	1	0	0	0
Colorado	Delta	f	Cory	14 July 2005	equ	2	1	0	0	0
Colorado	Delta	f	Delta	28 June 2005	equ	1	1	0	0	0
Colorado	Delta	f	Delta	5 July 2005	equ	1	1	0	0	0
Colorado	Delta	f	Delta	5 July 2005	equ	41	1	0	0	0
Colorado	Delta	f	Delta	7 July 2005	equ	1	1	0	0	0
Colorado	Delta	f	Olathe	28 June 2005	equ	1	1	0	0	0
Colorado	La Plata	f	Hesperus	7 July 2005	equ	3	1	0	0	0
Colorado	Mesa	f	Junction	12 July 2005	equ	3	1	0	0	0
Colorado	Montrose	f	Montrose	30 June 2005	equ	6	1	0	0	0
Colorado	Montrose	f	Montrose	1 July 2005	equ	1	1	0	0	0
Colorado	Montrose	f	Montrose	5 July 2005	equ	1	1	0	0	0
Colorado	Montrose	f	Montrose	10 July 2005	equ	4	1	0	0	0
Colorado	Montrose	f	Montrose	11 July 2005	bov	30	1	0	0	0
Colorado	Montrose	f	Montrose	11 July 2005	equ	6	1	0	0	0
					ovi	4	0	0	0	0
					cap	8	0	0	0	0
New Mexico	Rio Arriba	f	Chama	9 July 2005	equ	12	4	0	0	0
New Mexico	Sandoval	f	Algodones	29 June 2005	equ	2	1	0	0	0
New Mexico	Sandoval	f	Corrales	5 July 2005	equ	2	1	0	0	0
New Mexico	Valencia	f	Belen	4 July 2005	bov	1	1	0	0	0
					equ	5	0	0	0	0
New Mexico	Valencia	f	Belen	6 July 2005	equ	3	3	0	0	0
Utah	Duchesne	f	Neola	3 July 2005	equ	2	1	0	0	0
Utah	Duchesne	f	Roosevelt	2 July 2005	bov	47	4	0	0	0
Utah	San Juan	f	Bluff	11 July 2005	equ	1	1	0	0	0

First administrative division (State)	Lower administrative division (County)	Type of epidemiological unit	Name of the location	Date of start of the outbreak	Species	Number of animals in the outbreaks				
						susceptible	cases	deaths	destroyed	slaughtered
Utah	San Juan	f	Moab	30 June 2005	equ	6	1	0	0	0
Utah	Grand	f	Moab	10 July 2005	equ	29	1	0	0	0
Utah	Grand	f	Moab	11 July 2005	equ	2	1	0	0	0
					cap	1	0	0	0	0
Utah	Uintah	f	Ballard	29 June 2005	equ	4	2	0	0	0
Utah	Uintah	f	Ballard	6 July 2005	equ	2	0	0	0	0
					bov	60	1	0	0	0
Utah	Uintah	f	Duchesne	5 July 2005	equ	7	1	0	0	0
Utah	Uintah	f	Duchesne	11 July 2005	equ	23	1	0	0	0
Utah	Uintah	f	Gusher	8 July 2005	equ	5	1	0	0	0
Utah	Uintah	f	Jensen	2 July 2005	bov	20	4	0	0	0
Utah	Uintah	f	Jensen	10 July 2005	equ	4	1	0	0	0
Utah	Uintah	f	Jensen	13 July 2005	equ	11	2	0	0	0
					bov	5	0	0	0	0
Utah	Uintah	f	Lapoint	10 July 2005	equ	5	1	0	0	0
Utah	Uintah	f	Randlett	6 July 2005	bov	800	2	0	0	0
					equ	8	0	0	0	0
Utah	Uintah	f	Vernal	4 July 2005	equ	3	1	0	0	0
Utah	Uintah	f	Vernal	8 July 2005	equ	5	1	0	0	0
Utah	Uintah	f	Vernal	10 July 2005	equ	12	0	0	0	0
					bov	15	1	0	0	0
Utah	Uintah	f	Vernal	11 July 2005	equ	6	1	0	0	0

f = farm

Diagnosis:

Laboratories where diagnosis was made	Species examined	Diagnostic tests used	Dates	Results
Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory, Plum Island, New York	bov	virus isolation	14 July 2005	positive
		complement fixation test	15, 23 July 2005	
National Veterinary Services Laboratories, Ames, Iowa	equ	virus isolation	15, 19, 22 July 2005	
		complement fixation test	16, 23 July 2005	

Source of outbreaks or origin of infection: unknown or inconclusive.

Control measures undertaken:

- control of arthropods;
- quarantine;
- on-going surveillance activities are being performed by APHIS Veterinary Services and Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Texas⁽¹⁾ and Utah State Departments of Agriculture personnel.

Treatment of affected animals: no.

Vaccination prohibited: yes.

(1) Note: no new vesicular stomatitis-positive premises have been reported in Texas since May 2005.

NEWCASTLE DISEASE IN ISRAEL

(**Date of previous outbreak of Newcastle disease in Israel reported to the OIE:** May 2005).

IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION REPORT

Information received on 24 July 2005 from Dr Moshe Chaimovitz, Director of Veterinary and Animal Health Services, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Beit-Dagan:

Report date: 24 July 2005.

Reason for immediate notification: re-occurrence of a listed disease or infection in a country or zone/compartiment following a report declaring the outbreak ended.

Date of first confirmation of the event: 17 July 2005.

Date of start of the event: 13 July 2005.

Nature of diagnosis: clinical, post-mortem and laboratory.

Details of outbreak:

First administrative division	Lower administrative division	Type of epidemiological unit	Name of the location	Species	Number of animals in the outbreak				
					susceptible	cases	deaths	destroyed	slaughtered
Acco	...	village	Peqi'in Hadasha	avi	8,000	60	50	7,950	0

Description of affected population: two flock units of table egg layers were affected.

Diagnosis:

Laboratories where diagnosis was made	Diagnostic tests used	Date	Results
Tsfat regional poultry disease laboratory
Kimron Veterinary Institute	haemagglutination inhibition test
	pathogen isolation by egg inoculation	17 July 2005	positive
	PCR ⁽¹⁾	19 July 2005	positive
	intracerebral pathogenicity index (ICPI) test	in progress	pending

Source of outbreak or origin of infection: unknown or inconclusive.

Control measures undertaken:

- the flock was destroyed on 22 July 2005;
- all poultry holdings in the three villages within a radius of 3 km of the outbreak were checked serologically and/or clinically for Newcastle disease;
- orders were issued to the owners of all poultry and other avian species within a radius of 10 km to perform an immediate booster vaccination (using live vaccine by spray – VH strain ICPI 0.15);
- disinfection of infected premises;
- movement control inside the country.

Vaccination prohibited: no. Newcastle vaccination is compulsory in Israel.

(1) PCR: polymerase chain reaction

AVIAN INFLUENZA IN RUSSIA

IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION REPORT

Translation of information received on 24 July 2005 from Dr Evgueny A. Nepoklonov, Head of the Main Veterinary Department, Ministry of Agriculture and Food, Moscow:

Report date: 24 July 2005 (see also *Disease Information*, **18** [29], 212, dated 22 July 2005).

Precise identification of agent: influenza virus type A. The haemagglutinin subtype has been preliminarily identified (from pathological material) as H5. After confirmation by virus isolation a separate notification will be sent. Tests are being performed to determine the neuraminidase type.

Date of first confirmation of the event: 23 July 2005.

Date of start of the event: 18 July 2005.

Nature of diagnosis: clinical, post-mortem and laboratory.

Details of outbreak:

First administrative division	Lower administrative division	Type of epidemiological unit	Name of the location	Date of start of the outbreak	Species	Number of animals in the outbreak				
						susceptible	cases	deaths	destroyed	slaughtered
Novosibirsk region (Novosibirskaya oblast)	Kupino	village	...	18 July 2005	avi
	Dovolnoye	village	...	22 July 2005	avi
	Chistoozernoje	village	...	22 July 2005	avi

Description of affected populations: chickens, turkeys, ducks and geese in backyard holdings in nine villages.



Diagnosis:

Laboratory where diagnosis was made	Diagnostic tests used	Date	Results
Federal Centre for Animal Health (ARRIAH)	- ELISA ⁽¹⁾ (for antigen detection); - PCR ⁽²⁾ (M-protein gene); - haemagglutination test.	23 July 2005	positive

Source of outbreaks or origin of infection: an epidemiological analysis has shown that the disease started in a flock in contact with wild waterfowl at open water reservoirs. This is proposed as the primary source of the virus. In addition, there are reports of the disease in wild birds.

Control measures undertaken:

- stamping out;
- quarantine;
- movement control inside the country;
- screening;
- zoning;
- disinfection of infected premises/establishments.

Vaccination prohibited: yes.

Other details/comments:

- Considering the low mortality rate (from 1% to 2.6% depending on the locality), the virus titres are very high in some samples of pathological material.
- No signs of the disease have appeared in commercial poultry farms in the region.
- The reasons for the disease's lack of species specificity are still unclear. Bacteriological and toxicological tests of samples of water and soil from around the water and feeding points in the affected areas are continuing.
- Newcastle disease virus was not found in samples from the affected areas.

(1) ELISA: enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay

(2) PCR: polymerase chain reaction

Note by the OIE Animal Health Information Department: Changes in the obligations of OIE Member Countries to notify avian influenza ("notifiable avian influenza"), which were adopted during the 73rd OIE General Session in May 2005, will come into effect on 1 January 2006. The OIE Animal Health Information Department is publishing the above report, based on the official notification received from the Delegate of Russia, because of the importance of monitoring the disease situation in Asia.

CLASSICAL SWINE FEVER IN SOUTH AFRICA
Follow-up report No. 1

Information received on 27 July 2005 from Dr Botlhe Modisane, Senior Manager of Animal Health, National Department of Agriculture, Pretoria:

End of previous report period: 12 July 2005 (see *Disease Information*, **18** [28], 201, dated 15 July 2005).

End of this report period: 26 July 2005.

Date of first confirmation of the event: 8 July 2005.

Date of start of the event: 13 June 2005.

Nature of diagnosis: clinical, post-mortem and laboratory.

Details of outbreaks (data corrected and updated):

First administrative division (province)	Lower administrative division	Type of epidemiological unit	Name of the location	Date of start of the outbreak	Species	Number of animals in the outbreaks				
						susceptible	cases	deaths	destroyed	slaughtered
Western Cape	Worcester	farm	Bonne Esperance	9 July 2005	sui	177	...	15	162	0
Western Cape	Worcester	farm	Buffelskraal	9 July 2005	sui	1,911	...	774	1,137	0
Western Cape	Worcester	village	De Doorns	9 July 2005	sui	25	3*	0	25	0
Western Cape	Worcester	village	Hex River Valley	9 July 2005	sui	181	0	0	181	0
Western Cape	Worcester	village	Lille	9 July 2005	sui	36	2*	0	36	0
Western Cape	Worcester	village	Zwelletemba	9 July 2005	sui	51	9*	0	51	0

* no clinical disease detected; diagnosed on serology

Description of affected populations:

- Two commercial piggeries (at Bonne Esperance and Buffelskraal) with Landrace pigs.
- Three informal settlements (De Doorns, Lille and Zwelletemba) with mixed breeds.

In addition, all the pigs in several smallholdings (one to two pigs per holding) within Hex River Valley where collected and destroyed, even though no disease could be detected.

Diagnosis:

Laboratories where diagnosis was made	Diagnostic tests used	Date	Results
Provincial Veterinary Laboratory, Stellenbosch, South Africa	- clinical examination ; - macro- and histopathology; - cross-reaction with bovine virus diarrhoea (BVD) antigen.	5 July 2005	typical pathology; positive cross-reaction with BVD
Onderstepoort Veterinary Institute, South Africa	antibody ELISA ⁽¹⁾	8 July 2005	positive
Institute of Virology, Hanover Veterinary School, Germany	RT-PCR ⁽²⁾	16 July 2005	positive
VLA Weybridge, United Kingdom	RT-PCR ⁽²⁾	19 July 2005	positive

Sequencing results still pending.

Source of outbreaks: unknown or inconclusive.

Control measures undertaken:

- Road blocks and movement control are still being enforced. A total embargo on movement of pigs and pig products from the affected area is still in place.
- Stamping out was applied. All the cadavers of pigs were buried in trenches and covered with lime.

Sequence of operations

	Stamping out	Cleaning and first disinfection
Buffelskraal	8-10 July 2005	16-17 July 2005
Bonne Esperance	12 July 2005	16-17 July 2005
De Doorns	14 July 2005	to be completed this week
Hex River Valley	14 July 2005	started on 25 July 2005
Zwelletemba	14 July 2005	to be completed this week
Lille	26 July 2005	to be completed this week

Vaccination prohibited: yes.

Other details/comments:

Trace-back investigations on the possible origin of the disease led to the retesting of duplicate samples from pigs that died on a smallholding in the Worcester area in October 2004 from a disease that could not be identified at the time. In 2004, samples from these animals tested negative for porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome (PRRS); African swine fever (ASF) had been suspected on the basis of histopathology but samples subsequently tested negative. The Western Cape is about 2,000 km south of the endemic ASF area. The duplicate samples now tested positive for classical swine fever (CSF).

All other duplicate samples kept from the PRRS outbreak in 2004 in the Western Cape were also tested for CSF, with negative results.

(1) ELISA: enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay

(2) RT-PCR: reverse transcriptase – polymerase chain reaction

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AVIAN INFLUENZA IN JAPAN
Follow-up report No. 1

Information received on 28 July 2005 from Dr Hirofumi Kugita, Chief Veterinary Officer, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Tokyo:

End of previous report period: 27 June 2005 (see *Disease Information*, **18** [26], 176, dated 1 July 2005).

End of this report period: 15 July 2005.

Precise identification of agent: low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) virus type H5N2.

Date of first confirmation of the event: 26 June 2005.

Date of start of the event: 24 June 2005.

Nature of diagnosis: laboratory. The affected populations showed little or no clinical signs of the disease.

Details of outbreaks (data corrected and updated):

First administrative division (prefecture)	Lower administrative division	Type of epidemiological unit	Date of start of the outbreak	Species	Number of animals in the outbreak				
					susceptible	cases	deaths	destroyed	slaughtered
Ibaraki	Mitsukaido city	farm	24 June 2005	avi	24,504	24,504	...
Ibaraki	Mitsukaido city	farm*	26 June 2005	avi	123,975	123,975	...
Ibaraki	Bando city	farm	26 June 2005	avi	8,486	8,486	...

* 5 farms

Diagnosis:

Laboratory where diagnosis was made	Diagnostic tests used	Date	Results
National Institute of Animal Health (national reference laboratory)	- agar gel precipitation test; - PCR ⁽¹⁾ ; - pathogen isolation by egg inoculation.	...	positive
	intravenous pathogenicity index (IVPI) test	9 July 2005	0.0

Source of outbreak or origin of infection: unknown or inconclusive.

Control measures undertaken:

- movement control on infected farms and on farms within a 5-km radius of the infected farms;
- stamping out: all chickens on the seven farms (including the index farm) where diagnostic tests were positive have already been destroyed;
- disinfection of infected premises;
- on-site investigations on farms within a 5-km radius of the infected farms;
- the breeding farms where infected chickens were hatched have been investigated, with negative results.

Vaccination prohibited: yes.

(1) PCR: polymerase chain reaction

NEWCASTLE DISEASE IN FRANCE
Follow-up report No. 1

Translation of information received on 27 July 2005 from Dr Monique Eloit, Deputy Director General, General Directorate for Food (DGAL), Ministry of Agriculture, Food, Fisheries and Rural Affairs, Paris:

End of previous report period: 19 July 2005 (see *Disease Information*, **18** [29], 205, dated 22 July 2005).

End of this report period: 27 July 2005.

Date of first confirmation of the event: 19 July 2005.

Nature of diagnosis: clinical and laboratory.

Details of outbreak (updated data):

First administrative division (region)	Lower administrative division (department)	Type of epidemiological unit	Name of the location	Species	Number of animals in the outbreak				
					susceptible	cases	deaths	destroyed	slaughtered
Pays-de-la-Loire	Loire-Atlantique	farm	St-Mars-de-Coutais	avi	approx. 55,000*	approx. 55,000*	...

* approximately 35,000 partridges and 20,000 pheasants

Diagnosis:

Laboratories where diagnosis was made	Diagnostic tests used	Date	Results
Côtes-d'Armor Department Laboratory	haemagglutination inhibition test	19 July 2005	positive; geometric mean titre: 217.5
AFSSA ⁽¹⁾ Ploufragan (national reference laboratory)	molecular sequencing	26 July 2005	presence of a virulent sequence

Viral cultures are being carried out on embryonated eggs in order to isolate the virus and determine its intracerebral pathogenicity index.

Source of outbreak or origin of infection: unknown or inconclusive (contact with wild animals?).

Control measures undertaken:

- Stamping-out policy was applied on 20-21 July 2005 on both units where the affected farm is located.
- A 3-km radius protection zone and a 10-km radius surveillance zone were set up. Poultry movements out of these zones have been prohibited. In addition, in the protection zone, poultry flocks are being subjected to veterinary inspections and to sampling in order to carry out serological tests. These measures had largely been implemented as a precautionary step from 15 July.

Other details/comments: the preliminary results of the investigations carried out around the outbreak indicate the absence of clinical signs in the neighbouring farms.

Newcastle disease in France Additional information

Information received on 27 July 2005 from Dr Monique Eloit, Deputy Director General, General Directorate for Food (DGAL), Ministry of Agriculture, Food, Fisheries and Rural Affairs, Paris:

Report date: 27 July 2005.

1. Initial detection of disease

On 15 July 2005, the French authorities were informed by the British authorities of a confirmed outbreak of Newcastle disease (ND) on a pheasant farm in Surrey, England. The French authorities immediately launched an epidemiological investigation to determine whether French farms could be at risk.

The results of this investigation revealed that five farms located in two French *départements* – one in Loire-Atlantique and four in Vendée – had supplied the affected English farm with pheasants in three consignments between 21 June 2005 and 5 July 2005. The five farms were immediately blocked and placed under surveillance.

Also on 15 July 2005, veterinary inspections as well as serological and virological sampling were conducted on these farms.

These veterinary inspections did not reveal any clinical signs at the Vendée farms or in the area surrounding the Loire-Atlantique farm. However, some mild and nonspecific clinical signs were observed in a small number of animals at the suspect farm, where only pheasants and partridges are bred.

To date, positive serological test results have only been obtained in the Loire-Atlantique farm. Virological tests are still underway, and the preliminary results have all been negative. Final results will be available in early August.

Alongside these tests, the relevant national laboratory (AFSSA Ploufragan) carried out molecular sequencing of fragments of genetic material which revealed that the protein sequence for fusion site F and surrounding the cleavage site is RRQRRF, indicating a virulent strain of avian paramyxovirus 1. These laboratory results led the French authorities to notify the OIE and the European Commission of an ND outbreak at the Loire-Atlantique farm. The sequence identified is very similar to viruses of the phylogenic line of the 5b group.

2. Chronology

Date	Series of events and analyses
20 June	3,500 young pheasants from two farms in the Vendée <i>département</i> were exported to Surrey, in the south of England.
22 June	2,500 young pheasants from a farm in the Loire-Atlantique <i>département</i> were exported to Surrey.
4 July	2,700 young pheasants from two farms in the Vendée <i>département</i> were exported to Surrey.
15 July	British authorities issued information on the suspected ND occurrence in the United Kingdom and its epidemiological link to France.
15 July	The five implicated Vendée and Loire-Atlantique farms were blocked and placed under surveillance.
15 July	Veterinary inspections were conducted in the farms involved and samples were collected for serological and virological testing.
18 July (evening)	The serological results were positive for the Loire-Atlantique farm and negative for the other farms.

Date	Series of events and analyses
19 July	Notification to the OIE: strong suspicion of ND. Situation presented to the European Commission and the Member States. No special European Union safeguard measures were deemed necessary.
20 and 21 July	Preventive culling of 55,000 animals on the Loire Atlantique farm.
21 July	First intermediate result of the virological analysis was negative for the Loire-Atlantique farm.
22 July	First virological results were negative for the Vendée farms.
26 July (evening)	Molecular sequencing: Identification of a virulent sequence (APMV1).
27 July	Notification to the OIE and the European Commission of an ND outbreak.

3. Measures taken in France

- 3.1. The five farms were blocked and placed under surveillance as of 15 July 2005. Following negative serological and virological results, and in the absence of clinical signs for the four Vendée farms, this restriction was lifted on 26 July. It remains in force at the Loire-Atlantique farm.
- 3.2. Following positive serological results, and as a preventive measure, the Loire-Atlantique farm's 55,000 animals, located on two sites, were culled on 20 and 21 July. Disinfection was carried out from 22 July to 25 July.
- 3.3. All farms belonging to the same poultry cooperative company were placed under official control, along with the 19 farms located within a 3-km radius of the infected farm (the protection zone) and the 59 farms within a 10-km radius (the surveillance zone). In the protection zone, poultry farms are blocked and must undergo veterinary inspections and serological tests. In the surveillance zone, only restriction of animal movement is applied. These measures had largely been implemented as a precautionary step from 15 July.

4. Control of intra-Community trade and exports

As concerns the movements of poultry products defined by Article 2.7.13.4. of the *Terrestrial Animal Health Code*, even before the outbreak in the Loire-Atlantique *département* was confirmed, France, with the agreement of the European Commission, decided to implement the following precautionary measures:

- 4.1. Intra-Community trade: Intra-Community trade is not subject to restrictive measures unless it originates from the Loire-Atlantique *département*, where trade is temporarily suspended pending the conclusions of the epidemiological investigation.
- 4.2. Exports to third countries: Certification for the export of French poultry products to other countries was suspended. In response to favourable developments, certification was reauthorised as of 21 July for exports to countries that do not require ND free status for France, with the exception of poultry products from the Loire-Atlantique *département*.

5. Epidemiological investigations

5.1. Possible sources of infection:

The precise source of the disease is unknown at this stage but a link with avifauna cannot be ruled out given the infected farm's close proximity to a lake known for its migratory bird population. This is the most likely hypothesis, but all potentially infectious epidemiological contacts must be considered, in particular the movement of humans, equipment, and vehicles.

The epidemiological investigations are ongoing.

5.2. Potential risks of spreading:

The Loire-Atlantique farm is located in an area where mainly game birds are bred; there is no nearby large-scale domestic poultry farm, hatchery, or breeder.

The 3-km protection zone contains 19 farms, which are currently undergoing veterinary inspections and serological sampling. No clinical signs of ND have been detected. Sampling is now underway.

The 10-km surveillance zone contains 59 farms. No clinical signs of ND have been found thus far.

No animal has left the affected farm for any location in France, the European Union, or any other country since 1 June, with the exception of the 22 June shipment to the United Kingdom. In addition, all farms under surveillance have been blocked. No poultry products may leave them as long as surveillance measures remain in place.

5.3. Summary of the situation:

Although the ND outbreak in France was confirmed on 27 July, all protective and control measures had been pre-emptively put in place as of 15 July. Moreover, an epidemiological investigation determined that no potentially infected poultry product was exported or traded, even considering an extended security period starting on 1 June.

(1) AFSSA: *Agence française de sécurité sanitaire des aliments* (French Agency for Food Safety)

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HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA IN THAILAND
Follow-up report No. 62

Information received on 29 July 2005 from Dr Yukol Limlamthong, Director General, Department of Livestock Development (DLD), Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Bangkok:

End of previous report period: 20 July 2005 (see *Disease Information*, **18** [29], 207, dated 22 July 2005).

End of this report period: 28 July 2005.

Date of first confirmation of the event: 23 January 2004.

Nature of diagnosis: clinical, post-mortem and laboratory.

Details of outbreak:

First administrative division (province)	Lower administrative division	Type of epidemiological unit	Name of the location	Date of start of the outbreak	Species	Number of animals in the outbreak				
						susceptible	cases	deaths	destroyed	slaughtered
SuphanBuri	Banpoh, Muang	village	village No. 8	19 July 2005	avi	19	4	4	15	...
SuphanBuri	DonKa, U Tong	village	village No. 8	20 July 2005	avi	30	1	1
Kampaengphet	PohTong, PangSilathong	village	village No. 3	21 July 2005	avi	28	9	2	26	...
SuphanBuri	U Tong, U Tong	village	village No. 1	22 July 2005	avi	32	5	5	27	...

Description of affected population in the new outbreaks: village chickens which were free ranging or with minimal biosecurity.

Diagnosis:

Laboratories where diagnosis was made	Diagnostic tests used	Results
National Institute of Animal Health and Regional Veterinary Research and Development Centres, DLD	- agar-gel precipitation test; - haemagglutination test; - pathogen isolation by egg inoculation; - intracerebral pathogenicity index test.	positive

Source of new outbreaks: unknown or inconclusive.

Control measures undertaken:

- stamping out;
- quarantine;
- movement control inside the country;
- screening;
- zoning;
- disinfection of infected premises/establishments.

Vaccination prohibited: yes.

Other details/comments: the case findings resulted from the second nationwide active surveillance campaign, being conducted from 1 to 31 July 2005. The purpose of this surveillance is to evaluate the present status of highly pathogenic avian influenza after the second wave of outbreaks (between 3 July 2004 and 12 April 2005).

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