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EQUINE INFECTIOUS ANAEMIA IN FRANCE

(**Date of previous outbreak of equine infectious anaemia in France reported to the OIE:** 2001).

IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION REPORT

Translation of information received on 1 April 2005 from Dr Monique Eloit, Deputy Director General, General Directorate for Food (DGAL), Ministry of Agriculture, Food, Fisheries and Rural Affairs, Paris:

Report date: 1 April 2005.

Reason for immediate notification: re-occurrence of a listed disease or infection in a country or zone/compartiment.

Date of first confirmation of the event: 1 April 2005.

Details of outbreak:

First administrative division	Type of epidemiological unit	Name of the location	Species	Number of animals in the outbreak				
				susceptible	cases	deaths	destroyed	slaughtered
Eure-et-Loir department	farm	Barjouville district	equ	22	1	0

Description of affected population: a 10-year-old mare of the French saddle horse breed, in an equestrian centre.

Diagnosis:

Laboratory where diagnosis was made	Diagnostic tests used	Date	Results
French Agency for Food Safety (AFSSA ⁽¹⁾) (national reference laboratory)	Coggins test	1 April 2005	positive

Source of outbreak or origin of infection: investigations are under way to determine the origin of the outbreak and look for other possible infected equids.

Control measures:

- A. Undertaken:** under the terms of a by-law, the equestrian centre was declared infected and all movements have been prohibited.
- B. To be undertaken:** the infected animal is soon to be slaughtered.

(1) AFSSA: Agence française de sécurité sanitaire des aliments

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HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA IN THAILAND
Follow-up report No. 50

Information received on 8 April 2005 from Dr Yukol Limlamthong, Director General, Department of Livestock Development (DLD), Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Bangkok:

End of previous report period: 17 March 2005 (see *Disease Information*, **18** [11], 85, dated 18 March 2005).

End of this report period: 7 April 2005.

No new outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza have been reported.

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AFRICAN SWINE FEVER IN BURKINA FASO
Follow-up report No. 1

Translation of information received on 5 April 2005 from Dr Zacharie Compaore, Director of Veterinary Services, Ministry of Animal Resources, Ouagadougou:

End of previous report period: 24 November 2004 (see *Disease Information*, **17** [48], 352, dated 26 November 2004).

End of this report period: 5 April 2005.

Following confirmation of the outbreak of African swine fever that occurred in Kadiogo province in November 2004, control and prevention measures were introduced:

- a decree (APDI No. 000176/MATD/PKAD/HC/CAB) dated 24 November 2004, declaring the province infected and prescribing the application of veterinary regulatory measures in Centre region, which includes Kadiogo province;
- preventive measures were recommended for the regions of Centre-Sud, Centre-Ouest and Plateau-Central, together covering ten provinces, namely: Bazéga⁽¹⁾, Boulkiemdé⁽²⁾, Ganzourgou⁽³⁾, Kourwéogo⁽³⁾, Nahouri⁽¹⁾, Oubritenga⁽³⁾, Sanguié⁽²⁾, Sissili⁽²⁾, Ziro⁽²⁾ and Zoundwéogo⁽¹⁾.

For various reasons these offensive and defensive measures could not be implemented immediately. Restocking of pig farms was in fact observed in Kadiogo and the control of pig movements did not come into force until 18 February 2005. As a result, the disease spread within Kadiogo province and to the regions of Centre-Sud and Plateau-Central. Deaths are still being recorded by the Regional Directorate of Centre region; as of 11 March 2005, 3,883 animals had died. Furthermore, deaths that have occurred in the provinces of Bazéga⁽¹⁾ (44 animals dead), Zoundwéogo⁽¹⁾ (22 animals dead), Nahouri⁽¹⁾ and Oubritenga⁽³⁾ are suspected to be due to African swine fever.

Measures taken:

- a. Signing of a provincial decree on 28 February 2005 (in addition to the decree of 24 November 2004), instituting penalties for contravening the veterinary regulatory measures.
- b. Arrangements to send new samples to reference laboratories.
- c. Continuation of activities relating to:
 - informing pig producers, pig slaughterers and consumers of pig products about African swine fever;
 - explaining the veterinary regulatory measures introduced to control and eradicate the disease;
 - strengthening the preparedness of farm auxiliaries to conduct disinfection operations;
 - strengthening the surveillance system through active surveillance of pig farms.

(1) in Centre-Sud region
 (2) in Centre-Ouest region
 (3) in Plateau-Central region

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NEWCASTLE DISEASE IN GREECE

(Date of previous outbreak of Newcastle disease in Greece reported to the OIE: December 2004).

IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION REPORT

Information received on 6 April 2005 from Dr Vasilios Stylos, Head, Animal Health Directorate, Ministry of Agriculture, Athens:

Report date: 6 April 2005.

Reason for immediate notification: re-occurrence of a listed disease in a country or zone/compartiment following a report declaring the outbreak(s) ended.

Date of first confirmation of the event: 5 April 2005.

Date of start of the event: 8 March 2005.

Nature of diagnosis: clinical, post-mortem and laboratory.

Details of outbreak:

First administrative division	Lower administrative division	Type of epidemiological unit	Name of the location	Latitude	Longitude
Central Macedonia	Kilkis	farm	village of Leventochori*	40° 57' 02'' N	22° 49' 47'' E

* 10 km from the town of Kilkis

Date of start of the outbreak	Species	Number of animals in the outbreak				
		susceptible	cases	deaths	destroyed	slaughtered
8 March 2005	avi	35,000	...	3,880	31,120	0

Description of affected population: chickens of various ages.

Diagnosis:

Laboratory where diagnosis was made	Diagnostic tests used	Date	Results
VLA Weybridge, United Kingdom (OIE Reference Laboratory for Newcastle disease).	- virus isolation in embryonated fowl eggs; - haemagglutination test; - haemagglutination inhibition test; - intracerebral pathogenicity index (ICPI) test (1.625).	5 April 2005	positive

Source of outbreak: unknown or inconclusive.

Control measure undertaken:

- stamping out;
- zoning;
- disinfection of infected premises/establishment(s).

Vaccination prohibited: no.

Other details/comments:

- The infected farm consists of five houses located on private land. At the time of the suspicion, four of them were fully stocked with chickens and one house was empty.
- There are a few other farms in the area but all are more than 10 km from the infected farm. All of these farms are vaccinated against Newcastle disease. Strict surveillance has now been carried out on these farms for nearly one month but no clinical signs of Newcastle disease have been detected.

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AVIAN INFLUENZA IN THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION

Information received on 7 and 8 April 2005 from Dr Ri Gyong Gun, Director of the Veterinary and Anti-Epizootic Bureau, Ministry of Agriculture, Pyongyang:

Report date: 5 April 2005.

Reason for immediate notification: first occurrence of a listed disease⁽¹⁾ in the country.

Precise identification of agent: avian influenza virus type A subtype H7.

Date of first confirmation of the event: 26 March 2005.

Date of start of the event: 25 February 2005.

Nature of diagnosis: clinical and laboratory.

Diagnosis:

Laboratories where diagnosis was made	Diagnostic tests used
- Laboratory of the Pyongyang Poultry General Complex; - Central Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory; - Institute of the Cells and Gene Engineering, Academy of National Sciences.	- haemagglutination test; - haemagglutination inhibition test; - ELISA ⁽²⁾ ; - PCR ⁽³⁾ .

Source of outbreak: unknown or inconclusive.

Control measures undertaken:

- control of arthropods;
- control of wildlife reservoirs;
- partial stamping out;
- quarantine;
- movement control inside the country;
- screening;
- vaccination;
- disinfection of infected premises/establishment(s).

Vaccination in response to the outbreak:

Poultry farm	Total number of vaccinated birds	Details of the vaccine
Hadang	255,570	inactivated virus vaccine
Sopo	283,531	
Mangyongdae	562,199	

Treatment of affected animals: no.

Additional details:

Respiratory distress syndrome was observed among the chickens in one of the blocks (the block has a capacity of 19,000 to 24,000) of the Hadang poultry farm, notably when there was a built up of poisonous fumes in the block caused by a power failure that occurred during the night of 23 to 24 February 2005. Air vents were opened to improve ventilation and provide fresh air, but from the next day some layers began to die.

Samples were sent for examination to the Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory of the Pyongyang Poultry General Complex on 28 February and strict anti-epizootic measures were taken.

The Diagnostic Laboratory of the General Complex conducted tests between 28 February and 5 March but was unable to identify the precise cause of the disease. It then informed the National Veterinary and Anti-epizootic Emergency Committee and sent samples and isolates to the Central Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory.

The National Veterinary and Anti-epizootic Emergency Committee organised the incineration and burying of all the chickens in the infected blocks and, with a view to identifying the disease, authorised the Central Laboratory to inject all the chickens in the unaffected blocks and in neighbouring chicken farms with an inactivated vaccine obtained by inoculating eggs with material from internal organs of dead chickens into embryonated eggs.

The Central Laboratory conducted general examinations several times between 5 and 15 March, but was unable to obtain a definite identification of the virus subtype due to the lack of standard sera and suitable testing kits, but was able to confirm that the disease was influenza type A.

With the help of Government measures, tests continued and the virus subtype was eventually confirmed, using the PCR⁽³⁾ technique, as avian influenza virus subtype H7 at the Institute of Cell and Gene Engineering, National Academy of Sciences, on 26 March.

The disease outbreak could eventually be officially announced in the country on 27 March.

Tests are currently under way to determine the N subtype of the virus.

On or around 5 March, an outbreak of the disease also occurred at the neighbouring Sopo and Mangyongdae chicken farms, which proved to be caused by the same subtype that affected the Hadang chicken farm.

At Hadang chicken farm a total of over 151,968 layer chickens in the eight blocks were destroyed. At the Sopo and Mangyongdae farms the damage was less extensive thanks to the vaccination that had

already been conducted, only three blocks with a total of 51,820 chickens being lost at Sopo and only a single block with over 15,000 chickens being lost at Mangyongdae poultry farm.

A total of over 218,882 chickens were culled and buried during the disease outbreaks. No clinical signs of the disease have been detected since 7 March 2005.

All the necessary anti-epizootic measures have been taken, including a ban on movements into and out of the affected area, in accordance with the provisions of the *Terrestrial Animal Health Code*. There has been great awareness of the disease among the human population in the affected area. Public health surveillance has been stepped up, especially for those involved in the destruction and burying of infected chickens. To date there have been no reported cases of human infection.

Investigations are under way throughout the country to try to determine the full extent of infection in poultry farms and in various wild bird populations.

As this disease event was one of the first of its kind ever to have occurred in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, it took some time to make the correct diagnosis. The inexperience of the veterinary experts, the inadequate facilities and apparatus and the lack of reagents, such as standard sera, caused by the country's recent economic difficulties had a negative effect on the conduct and timing of the diagnostic procedures.

The anti-epizootic measures taken on this occasion to eradicate the disease were in accordance with the technical standards of the OIE, but the lack of facilities such as reagents, apparatus and standard sera resulted in poor identification of virus subtype H7, though it was diagnosed as H7 by PCR⁽³⁾ analysis at the Veterinary Institute of the Academy of Agricultural Sciences and the Institute of Cell and Gene Engineering, Academy of National Sciences.

On 4 April 2005, an FAO⁽⁴⁾ expert visiting the Democratic People's Republic of Korea initially confirmed the virus as subtype H7.

(1) Note by the Animal Health Information Department: the listed disease is suspected to be highly pathogenic avian influenza

(2) ELISA: enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay

(3) PCR: polymerase chain reaction

(4) FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

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HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA IN INDONESIA Follow-up report No. 7 (contd)

Information received on 7 April 2005 from Prof. H.R. Wasito, Director General of Livestock Services, Department of Agriculture, Jakarta:

End of previous report period: 10 March 2005 (see *Disease Information*, **18** [10], 81, dated 11 March 2005).

End of this report period: 6 April 2005.

Precise identification of agent : highly pathogenic avian influenza virus subtype H5N1.

Nature of diagnosis: clinical, post-mortem and laboratory.

Details of the new outbreaks:

First administrative division (province)	Lower administrative division (district)	Type of epidemiological unit	Name of the location (subdistrict)	Date of start of the outbreak	Species	Number of animals in the outbreak				
						susceptible	cases	deaths	destroyed	slaughtered
Jawa Barat ⁽¹⁾	Cirebon	farm	Hariamukti	Jan. 2005	avi	12,000
Jawa Barat ⁽¹⁾	Cirebon	farm	Palimanan	Dec. 2004	avi	1,000	...	400
Jawa Barat ⁽¹⁾	Indramayu	village	Lohbener	6 Apr. 2005	avi	72
Jawa Barat ⁽¹⁾	Sakabumi	farm	Bojong Gonteng	Jan. 2005	avi	1,450	...	1,428
Jawa Barat ⁽¹⁾	Sakabumi	farm /village	Kabandungan	Jan. 2005	avi	370	...	247
Jawa Barat ⁽¹⁾	Subang	farm	Ciasom	Jan. 2005	avi	2,700	2,700	2,700	0	0
Jawa Barat ⁽¹⁾	Subang	farm	Kalijati	Jan. 2005	avi	4,100	...	3,000
Jawa Tengah ⁽²⁾	Boyolali	farm	Klego	12 Mar. 2005	avi	100,000	...	56,650
Jawa Tengah ⁽²⁾	Tegal	farm	Dukuhwaru	Dec. 2004	avi	6,750	...	6,000
Jawa Tengah ⁽²⁾	Tegal	farm	Karamat	...	avi	6,500	...	5,959
Jawa Tengah ⁽²⁾	Tegal	farm	Margasari	Feb. 2005	avi	1,000	...	900
Jawa Tengah ⁽²⁾	Tegal	farm	Pangkah	...	avi	16,200	...	13,000
Jawa Tengah ⁽²⁾	Tegal	farm	Slawi	...	avi	2,000	2,000	2,000	0	0
Jawa Tengah ⁽²⁾	Tegal	farm	Tarab	...	avi	5,000	5,000	5,000	0	0
Jawa Timur ⁽³⁾	Bojonegoro	farm	...	29 Mar. 2005	avi	1,500	...	52
Jawa Timur ⁽³⁾	Tuban	farm	...	29 Mar. 2005	avi	15,000	...	10,000
Sulawesi Selatan ⁽⁴⁾	Maros	farm	Banti Murung	27 Feb. 2005	avi	130,000	...	700
Sulawesi Selatan ⁽⁴⁾	Sidenreng Rappang	farm	Baranti	after 10 Mar. 2005	avi	440,000	...	43,715
Sulawesi Selatan ⁽⁴⁾	Sidenreng Rappang	farm	Dua Pilue		avi	800	...	50
Sulawesi Selatan ⁽⁴⁾	Sidenreng Rappang	farm	Kulo		avi	270,000	...	3,875
Sulawesi Selatan ⁽⁴⁾	Sidenreng Rappang	farm	Maritengngae		avi	1,200,000	...	54,170
Sulawesi Selatan ⁽⁴⁾	Sidenreng Rappang	farm	Panca Lautang		avi	260,000	...	100
Sulawesi Selatan ⁽⁴⁾	Sidenreng Rappang	farm	Panca Rijang		avi	240,000	...	40,350
Sulawesi Selatan ⁽⁴⁾	Sidenreng Rappang	farm	Siderang		avi	97,000	...	17,635
Sulawesi Selatan ⁽⁴⁾	Sidenreng Rappang	farm	Watang Pulu		avi	375,000	...	3,645
Sulawesi Selatan ⁽⁴⁾	Soppeng	village	Donri-Donri	after 27 Feb. 2005	avi	76,000	...	5,390
Sulawesi Selatan ⁽⁴⁾	Soppeng	village	Ganra		avi	63,000	...	7,910
Sulawesi Selatan ⁽⁴⁾	Soppeng	village	Lalabata		avi	109,000	...	900
Sulawesi Selatan ⁽⁴⁾	Soppeng	village	Lili Riaja		avi	160,000	...	4,900
Sulawesi Selatan ⁽⁴⁾	Soppeng	village	Lili Rilau		avi	160,000	...	1,200
Sulawesi Selatan ⁽⁴⁾	Soppeng	village	Marioriawa		avi	66,000	...	6,300
Sulawesi Selatan ⁽⁴⁾	Wajo	village	Belawa		avi	135,000	...	3,600
Sulawesi Selatan ⁽⁴⁾	Wajo	village	Pammana		avi	67,000	...	455
Sulawesi Selatan ⁽⁴⁾	Wajo	village	Sabang Paru		avi	175,000	...	9,057
Sulawesi Selatan ⁽⁴⁾	Wajo	village	Tanasitolo		avi	285,000	...	1,639
Sulawesi Selatan ⁽⁴⁾	Wajo	village	Tempe		avi	66,000	...	20,210

- (1) West Java province
- (2) Central Java province
- (3) East Java province
- (4) South Celebes province

Description of affected populations: populations affected were native chickens which are raised in traditional manner, broilers and layers in intensive farms. There were imported fighting cocks from other Asian countries.

Diagnosis:

Laboratories where diagnosis was made	Diagnostic tests used	Date	Results
Disease Investigation Center, Maros, and Disease Investigation Center, Wates	- haemagglutination inhibition test; - intracerebral pathogenicity index (ICPI) test (1.625).	8 March 2005	positive

Source of outbreaks:

- introduction of new animals/animal products;
- illegal movement of animals.

Control measures

A. Undertaken:

- quarantine;
- movement control inside the country;
- disinfection of infected premises/establishment(s).

B. To be undertaken: partial stamping out.

Vaccination in response to the outbreaks:

First administrative division	Total number of vaccinated animals	Details of the vaccine
Sulawesi Selatan	...	inactivated (killed virus)
Jawa Barat (December 2004 – March 2005)	22,201,500	
Jawa Tengah (December 2004 – March 2005)	49,232,261	
Jawa Timur (December 2004 – March 2005)	58,306,559	

Treatment of affected animals: no.

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MISCELLANEOUS: EPIDEMIOLOGICAL SURVEILLANCE FOR GLANDERS IN SYRIA

Information received on 6 April 2005 from Dr George Khoury, Director of Animal Health Services, Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, Damascus:

The epidemiological surveillance section of the Syrian Veterinary Services follows up any suspected cases of the disease on a continuous basis.

Syria has adopted procedures regarding the glanders situation. These procedures include implementation of epidemiological serological surveillance for the disease in horses.

Equine population in Syria

	Number of animals	Proportion (%)
Donkeys	129,530	84.25
Horses	16,843	10.95
Mules	7,387	4.80
Total	153,760	100

Given that glanders tends to occur in an acute form in donkeys and mules but runs a more chronic course in horses, epidemiological surveillance was implemented only in horses, which account for approximately 11% of the country's equine population (see table above).

Six provinces where horse keeping is concentrated were identified for the implementation of surveillance:

Province	Horse population
Aleppo	1,537
Alhasake	1,837
Damascus	2,008
Hama	1,504
Homs	1,572
Idleb	3,705
Total	12,163

As the horses in these provinces account for 72.2% of the total number of horses in Syria, the study was restricted to these provinces only.

Blood samples were randomly collected from 10% of the horse population in these provinces. The number of samples tested was 1,210. The diagnostic test used was the complement fixation test.

Results:

Province	No. of samples tested	Results
Aleppo	152	–
Alhasake	182	–
Damascus	200	–
Hama	150	–
Homs	156	–
Idleb	370	–
Total	1,210	–

Conclusion:

The results of serological tests appear to confirm that Syria remains free from glanders in horses.

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