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### **FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE IN SOUTH AFRICA FMD carrier buffaloes found within the free zone**

#### EMERGENCY REPORT

*Text of a fax received on 7 September 1998 from Dr P.P. Bosman, Chief Director of Veterinary Services and Livestock Improvement, Pretoria:*

Seven FMD carrier buffaloes (*Syncerus caffer*) were moved illegally to a game farm in the Northern Province. This farm is situated in the FMD free zone of South Africa. It has not yet been possible to determine the origin of these buffaloes but this is being actively investigated.

The owner of the above-mentioned game farm bought seven disease-free buffaloes from a game farmer in the Free State Province (also within the FMD free zone). These buffaloes arrived on the farm on 19 August 1998 and the arrival was reported to the local state veterinarian. The owner refused to off-load the buffalo as the movement permit was a fax copy and not the original permit as required in our legislation. The state veterinarian immediately investigated the matter on the same day and decided to have the animals tested for FMD. The animals were then off-loaded under official supervision in the neighbouring farms' quarantine camp. The farm was immediately put under quarantine. Blood was collected on 24 August 1998 and taken for testing to the Onderstepoort Institute for Epizootic Diseases. All seven buffalo were serologically positive for FMD virus: five were positive for SAT1, SAT2 and SAT3, one was positive for SAT1 and SAT3, and one was positive for SAT3 only.

On 3 September 1998 we took a second batch of samples from these buffaloes for virus isolation. All seven buffaloes were then destroyed and the carcasses burned and buried under official supervision.

We are still investigating to determine the origin of these animals as they could not have originated from the farm in the Free State Province as this farmer does not have a buffalo breeding herd on his farm.

FOLLOW-UP REPORT NO. 1

*Text of a fax received on 8 September 1998 from Dr P.P. Bosman, Chief Director of Veterinary Services and Livestock Improvement, Pretoria:*

**End of this report period:** 8 September 1998.

1. The serological profiles of the seven buffaloes correspond to what we find in our wildlife endemic FMD zone – that is the Kruger National Park and adjoining private reserves. Their exact origin still has to be determined, but it is most likely from one of these privately-owned reserves.
2. It must be stressed that the buffalo were not in contact with any susceptible animals at their destination – either the original or the final destination. The quarantine camp (officially approved) where they were kept from 19 August until 3 September is isolated with a buffer zone from both domestic and wild cloven-hoofed animals.
3. We received the results of the serological tests from the Onderstepoort Institute for Epizootic Diseases on 2 September. The seven buffalo were euthanised on 3 September and oesophageal scrapings and other diagnostic specimens were taken. The carcasses were incinerated.
4. The supposed farm of origin and the farm of destination and adjoining properties have been served with animal movement restriction orders and are under official surveillance.
5. The genetic profile of viruses isolated from the buffaloes will be matched with the latest Kruger Park isolates in order to confirm, or disprove, the probable origin of the buffaloes.
6. It should be stressed that FMD carrier buffaloes with positive serological titres normally shed relatively low amounts of virus. The situation is therefore not comparable with a clinical outbreak in cattle or, even worse, in pigs.
7. It has already been confirmed that serological titres were stable from 24 August to 3 September. The results of virus isolation efforts should be known in a day or two, with DNA sequencing taking another couple of days. Results of phylogenetic analyses should be available by 18 September.

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### CLASSICAL SWINE FEVER IN ARGENTINA

*Extract from the monthly report of Argentina for August 1998, received on 9 September 1998 from Dr L.O. Barcos, President of the National Department of Agrarian Health (SENASA), Ministry of Economy, Public Works and Services, Buenos Aires:*

**Date of last previous outbreak:** April 1995.

**Number of outbreaks of classical swine fever in August 1998:** one (1).

**Total number of animals in the outbreak:**

<i>susceptible</i>	<i>cases</i>	<i>deaths</i>	<i>destroyed</i>	<i>slaughtered</i>
300	60	5	5	1

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**Q FEVER IN ARGENTINA**  
**The Delegate declares his country free from the disease**

FOLLOW-UP REPORT No. 1

*Translation of a fax received on 14 September 1998 from Dr L.O. Barcos, President of the National Department of Agrarian Health (SENASA), Ministry of Economy, Public Works and Services, Buenos Aires:*

**End of previous report period:** 19 August 1998 (see *Disease Information*, **11** [35], 119, dated 4 September 1998).

**End of this report period:** 9 September 1998.

Following the stamping out of 390 goats, on 24 July 1998, due to Q fever, no new cases of this disease have been reported, and the Republic of Argentina maintains its status of freedom from Q fever.

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**PESTE DES PETITS RUMINANTS IN IRAQ**

EMERGENCY REPORT

*Text of a fax received on 15 September 1998 from Dr Fadhil Abbas Jassim, Director General, State Board of Veterinary Services, Ministry of Agriculture, Baghdad:*

**Nature of diagnosis:** clinical.

**Date of initial detection of animal health incident:** 27 July 1998.

<i>Location</i>	<i>No. of outbreaks</i>
Faida region, Neynawa province, in the northern part of the country	1

**Description of affected population:** disease involved local sheep and goats owned by one farmer only.

**Total number of animals in the outbreak:**

<i>species</i>	<i>susceptible</i>	<i>cases</i>	<i>deaths</i>	<i>destroyed</i>	<i>slaughtered</i>
o/c	900	100	0	0	5

**Source of agent / origin of infection:** probably an animal introduced illegally from a neighbouring country.

**Control measures during reporting period:** control programme, including vaccination and a ban on the movement of animals, covering the whole province.

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**OLD WORLD SCREWORM (*CHRYSOMYA BEZZIANA*) IN IRAQ**  
**Follow-up report**

FOLLOW-UP REPORT NO. 4

*Text of a fax received on 15 September 1998 from Dr Fadhil Abbas Jassim, Director General, State Board of Veterinary Services, Ministry of Agriculture, Baghdad:*

**End of previous report period:** 31 December 1996 (see *Disease Information*, **10** [4], 14, dated 24 January 1997).

**End of this report period:** 30 July 1998.

**Total number of outbreaks identified since 1 August 1996:** thirteen (13).

**Location of the outbreaks:** Anbar, Babil, Baghdad, Basra, Diyala, Kerbala, Missan, Muthana, Najaf, Qadisiya, Salah-Aldin, Thiqr, Wassit.

**Description of affected population in the outbreaks:** the disease involved local and exotic breeds of animals owned by farmers in villages and dairy farms. Human cases were also observed, principally in children and the elderly.

**Total number of cases in the outbreaks:**

No.	Governorate	No. of cases	
		in animals	in humans
1	Baghdad	12,029	0
2	Diyala	2,715	12
3	Kerbala	13,930	1
4	Wassit	1,184	0
5	Babil	19,138	5
6	Qadisiya	2,277	1
7	Anbar	2,445	0
8	Najaf	4,237	1
9	Muthana	496	0
10	Salah-Aldin	36	0
11	Thiqr	210	2
12	Missan	3	0
13	Basra	19	0
Total		58,719	22

**Source of agent / origin of infection:** the manner in which the screwworm fly entered the country is not yet known.

**Control measures during reporting period:**

- Movement of animals into or out of the infested area was prohibited.
- All infested animals were treated and kept under daily observation.
- All livestock in, or adjacent to, high risk areas were treated with insecticides to reduce the risk of infestation.

**NEWCASTLE DISEASE IN DENMARK**  
**The Delegate declares his country free from the disease**

FOLLOW-UP REPORT No. 2

*Text of a fax received on 15 September 1998 from Dr E. Stougaard, Chief Veterinary Officer, Ministry of Agriculture, Frederiksberg:*

**End of previous report period:** 24 May 1998.

**End of this report period:** 15 September 1998.

All poultry – turkeys exclusively, 144,000 in total – involved in the two outbreaks (see *Disease Information*, **11** [21], 76, dated 29 May 1998), were killed on 5 March and rendered during the following three days. Preliminary cleansing and disinfection of the infected premises was initiated immediately after the killing of the turkeys. However, due to practical difficulties described in Follow-up Report No. 1, the final cleansing and disinfection was not completed until 23 June 1998.

As no further outbreaks occurred in the protection and the surveillance area, all restrictions were lifted on 23 July 1998.

In accordance with Chapter 2.1.15. of the *International Animal Health Code*, Denmark may be considered free from Newcastle disease six months after the occurrence of the last case, as stamping-out policy is practised.

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**RABIES IN DENMARK**  
**Additional information on the ovine case**

FOLLOW-UP REPORT No. 1

*Text of a fax received on 16 September 1998 from Dr E. Stougaard, Chief Veterinary Officer, Ministry of Agriculture, Frederiksberg:*

**End of previous report period:** 26 August 1998 (see *Disease Information*, **11** [34], 116, dated 28 August 1998).

**End of this report period:** 16 September 1998.

On 15 September 1998, the Danish Institute for Virus Research, Lindholm, reported that further characterisation of the isolated virus strain had been performed by the Central Veterinary Laboratory, Weybridge, United Kingdom. The isolated strain is the European bat lyssavirus type EBL-1a, which is identical to the bat rabies virus that is isolated sporadically from Danish bats.

The sheep flock in which the case occurred is still under restrictions, i.e. no animals can leave the holding without a permit from the Danish Veterinary Service. No other animals have shown any clinical signs of rabies.

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## CONTAGIOUS EQUINE METRITIS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

### EMERGENCY REPORT

Text of a fax received on 17 September 1998 from Dr J.M. Arnoldi, Deputy Administrator, Veterinary Services, United States Department of Agriculture, Washington, DC:

**Nature of diagnosis:** laboratory.

**Date of initial detection of animal health incident:** 16 September 1998.

**Estimated date of first infection:** 2 September 1998.

<i>Location</i>	<i>No. of outbreaks</i>
Anne Arundel County, State of Maryland	1
Ventura County, State of California	1

### **Description of affected population:**

- an imported 8 year-old Dutch warm-blooded stallion in show circuit only since importation, and
- an adult mare, 22 years old, used as a test mare at a quarantined facility for diagnosing contagious equine metritis (CEM) from stallions being imported to the United States of America.

### **Diagnosis:**

- A. Laboratory where diagnosis was made:** National Veterinary Services Laboratory, Ames, Iowa.
- B. Diagnostic tests used:** identification of *Taylorella equigenitalis*; fluorescent antibody of culture isolate; biochemical characteristics.

### **Epidemiology:**

- A. Source of agent / origin of infection:** infected imported stallion.
- B. Mode of spread:** sexual transmission from an imported stallion to a CEM-negative mare during importation testing.
- C. Other epidemiological details:** the mare had been in isolation with another test mare since being bred to the imported stallion in May 1998. The infection of the stallion had not been detected during importation testing, and the transmission to test mare went undetected until the mare was being re-qualified as a test mare for testing a newly imported stallion.

**Control measures during reporting period:** quarantine movement control and other precautions at frontiers and inside the country. The infected mare was destroyed. The testing of susceptible mares continues. The imported infected stallion has not serviced artificially nor naturally since importation and is quarantined and being treated.

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