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### **RINDERPEST IN TANZANIA**

#### **The Delegate to the OIE declares part of his country "provisionally free" from the disease**

*Text of a communication received on 5 June 1998 from Dr J.N. Melewas, Chief Veterinary Officer, Assistant Commissioner for Livestock Development, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Dar es Salaam:*

Tanzania's rinderpest control programme has a long history because of her geographical position. The ultimate goal of achieving rinderpest eradication in Tanzania is finally now a reality and it is therefore necessary to institute a mechanism for following the steps towards the OIE pathway for rinderpest freedom.


In this regard, the Livestock Development Division of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives has divided the country into two zones (see map on page 84):

#### 1. Zone A

Zone A comprises the districts lying south of the Central Railway Line (CRL) from Dar es Salaam to Kigoma and west of the Tabora-Mwanza railway. These districts are: Biharamulo, Bukoba, Bukombe, Chunya, Geita, Ilala, Ileje, Iringa, Kahama, Karagwe, Kasulu, Kibaha, Kibondo, Kigoma, Kilombero, Kilosa, Kilwa, Kinondoni, Kisarawe, Kyela, Lindi, Liwale, Ludewa, Mafia, Makete, Manyoni, Masasi, Mbarali, Mbeya, Mbinga, Mbozi, Mkuranga, Morogoro, Mpanda, Mpwapwa, Mtwara, Mufindi, Muleba, Nachingwea, Newala, Ngara, Njombe, Nkasi, Rufiji, Rungwe, Rwangwa, Sengerema, Sikonge, Songea, Sumbawanga, Tabora, Temeke, Tunduru, Ulanga and Urambo. Zone A also includes the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba.

Each of these districts has a District Veterinary Officer (DVO) who reports to the Chief Veterinary Officer through a respective Zonal Veterinary Investigation Centre, and a disease surveillance and reporting system exists. This system is capable of detecting clinical rinderpest if it were present within the zone. For more than 20 years, no outbreak or case of rinderpest has been recorded within Zone A, and no rinderpest vaccine has been released within this zone from January 1993 to date.

Considering the above, the Government of Tanzania declares Zone A provisionally free from rinderpest, with effect from January 1998.



## 2. Zone B

Zone B comprises the districts lying north of the railway line from Dar es Salaam to Tabora and east of the Tabora-Mwanza railway line. These districts are: Arumeru, Arusha, Babati, Bariadi, Bunda, Dodoma, Hai, Hanang, Igunga, Iramba, Karatu, Kiteto, Kondoa, Korogwe, Kwimba, Lushoto, Magu, Maswa, Mbulu, Meatu, Misungwi, Monduli, Muheza, Musoma, Mwanza, Ngorongoro, Nzega, Pangani, Rombo, Same, Serengeti, Shinyanga, Simanjiro, Singida, Tanga Handeni, Tarime and Ukerewe.

Each of these districts has a DVO who reports to the Chief Veterinary Officer, through a respective Zonal Veterinary Investigation Centre. A disease surveillance and reporting system exists, which is capable of detecting clinical rinderpest if it were present within the zone.

The districts of Zone B have been free from enzootic rinderpest since 1966. There were two temporary rinderpest incursions, in 1981 and 1997. Both incursions were caused by a mild virus, which was promptly eliminated by emergency vaccination campaigns.

Cattle in Zone B have been vaccinated against rinderpest extensively during the last six years and, as a result, herd immunity is currently over 85%. The use of rinderpest vaccine within Zone B precludes a declaration of "Provisional Freedom from Rinderpest", at least for the time being. However, all rinderpest vaccinations ceased in this zone in December 1997 and it is the opinion of the Veterinary Services in Tanzania that 12 months should elapse from the last outbreak before making a declaration of "Provisional Freedom from Rinderpest" in this zone. Should there be no further rinderpest outbreak in the country, Zone B will be declared provisionally free from rinderpest with effect from 1 July 1998.

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**POISONING BY *SIMARUBA AMARA* IN ARGENTINA  
in equids**

**[issued on 12 June 1998 under the following title:]  
Unidentified condition in equids in Argentina**

EMERGENCY REPORT

*Translation of an e-mail received on 8 June 1998 from Dr L.O. Barcos, President of the National Department of Agrarian Health (SENASA), Ministry of Economy, Public Works and Services, Buenos Aires:*

On 29 May 1998 SENASA was informed that horses stabled at the German Riding Club in the city of Buenos Aires were presenting clinical signs consistent with an infectious and contagious condition.

***Clinical manifestations***

Oedema and/or inflammation of the lips, with asymmetry of lips and nostrils, nasal erosions and secretion, erosive lesions of 2 to 5 mm in the mouth (palate, cheeks, gums, interior of lips and upper and lateral surfaces of the tongue).

Other signs observed are anal and genital erosions, inflammation and secretions. Some animals present a short period of slight hyperthermia. A possible non-infectious aetiology should not be ruled out.

***Diagnosis***

SENASA personnel have taken samples from affected animals, which are being processed at the SENASA Central Laboratory and at INTA (*Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria*, Castelar, province of Buenos Aires). To date, it has not been possible to identify any potential causal agent or the epidemiological mechanisms involved.

***Control measures***

In response to this event, SENASA has taken measures including the following: the stables of the German Riding Club and other premises with affected animals have been placed under quarantine and sick animals have been isolated within a zone delimited by provincial highway No. 41 and its extension as far as the bay of Samborombón, around the city of Buenos Aires, and delimited to the north and east by the coast of the province of Buenos Aires: ban on equestrian events and movement of equids between establishments, restrictions on entering and leaving this zone, and temporary suspension of delivery of certificates for the definitive or temporary export of equids.

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**FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE IN SOUTH AFRICA  
in impala**

***(Date of last previously reported outbreak:* November 1995).**

EMERGENCY REPORT

*Text of an e-mail received on 8 June 1998 from Dr P.P. Bosman, Chief Director of Veterinary Services and Livestock Improvement, Pretoria:*

***Nature of diagnosis:*** clinical, post-mortem and laboratory.

***Date of initial detection of animal health incident:*** 22 May 1998.

***Estimated date of first infection:*** 15 May 1998.

<i>Location</i>	<i>No. of outbreaks</i>
24° 27' S - 31° 24' E (within the central area of the Kruger National Park and adjacent private game reserve, incorporated into the Kruger Park)	1

**Description of affected population:** impala (*Aepyceros melampus*).

**Total number of animals in the outbreak:**

<i>species</i>	<i>susceptible</i>	<i>cases</i>	<i>deaths</i>	<i>destroyed</i>	<i>slaughtered</i>
fau	10,000	6	1	16	0

**Diagnosis:**

- A. Laboratory where diagnosis was made:** Onderstepoort Institute for Exotic Diseases.
- B. Diagnostic tests used:** virus isolation and PCR.
- C. Causal agent:** FMD virus serotype SAT1.

**Epidemiology:**

- A. Source of agent / origin of infection:** carrier African buffalo (*Syncerus caffer*).
- B. Mode of spread:** direct contact.
- C. Other epidemiological details:** the outbreak occurred within the FMD enzootic area of South Africa (Kruger National Park). No marketing of susceptible game animals or their products is allowed from this area.

**Control measures during reporting period:** normal zoosanitary measures instituted; strict movement control applied in the adjacent farming area; export of animals and animal products from the free zone not affected.

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## AFRICAN SWINE FEVER IN TOGO

**(Date of last previously reported outbreak:** November 1997).

### EMERGENCY REPORT

*Translation of a fax received on 8 June 1998 from Dr A. Seibou Sonhaye, Director of Animal Production and Fisheries, Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Production and Fisheries, Lomé:*

**Date of initial detection of animal health incident:** 27 May 1998.

**Estimated date of first infection:** 26 April 1998.

<i>Location</i>	<i>No. of outbreaks</i>
9° 32' N - 1° 11' E	1

**Description of affected population:** traditional production unit in semi-confinement.

**Total number of animals in the outbreak:**

<i>susceptible</i>	<i>cases</i>	<i>deaths</i>	<i>destroyed</i>	<i>slaughtered</i>
2,500	1,500	1,000	0	0

**Diagnosis:** laboratory diagnosis under way at Bingerville (Côte d'Ivoire).

**Epidemiology:**

- A. Source of agent / origin of infection:** probably from a neighbouring country.
- B. Mode of spread:** transborder movement.

## NEWCASTLE DISEASE IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

(*Date of last previously reported outbreak:* June 1997, in wild cormorants).

### EMERGENCY REPORT

*Text of a fax received on 8 June 1998 from Dr J.M. Arnoldi, Deputy Administrator, Veterinary Services, United States Department of Agriculture, Washington, DC:*

**Nature of diagnosis:** clinical, post-mortem and laboratory.

**Date of initial detection of animal health incident:** 7 June 1998.

**Estimated date of first infection:** 23 May 1998.

<i>Location</i>	<i>No. of outbreaks</i>
Fresno County, State of California	1

**Description of affected population:** the outbreak site had 48 game chickens including two game breeds (Shamos and Aceels). These birds were located at a single site which has game chickens only and no commercial poultry.

### **Total number of animals in the outbreak:**

<i>susceptible</i>	<i>cases</i>	<i>deaths</i>	<i>destroyed</i>	<i>slaughtered</i>
48	32	10	38*	0

\* euthanised by 8 June 1998.

### **Diagnosis:**

- A. Laboratory where diagnosis was made:** National Veterinary Services Laboratory, Ames, Iowa.
- B. Diagnostic tests used:** virus isolation and haemagglutination-inhibition test.
- C. Causal agent:** velogenic viscerotropic paramyxovirus type 1. The isolate was inoculated into eight chickens 4 to 6 weeks old. Six birds died and all had pathology characteristic of velogenic viscerotropic Newcastle disease virus.

**Epidemiology:** an extensive epidemiological investigation has been completed and at this point there is no evidence of live bird movements from the outbreak premises during the incubation of the disease and there is no evidence that the virus has spread from the initial outbreak site.

- A. Source of agent / origin of infection:** a review of bird, people and fomite movement is under way. Bird movement does not appear to be likely as the source for this outbreak. The current hypothesis is that the source of the virus was movement of people or fomites.
- B. Other epidemiological details:** the nearest commercial poultry operation is 17 miles from the outbreak site.

### **Surveillance measures taken to date:**

#### 1. Intensive surveillance area

Intensive surveillance was conducted in an area around the initial premises. In this area, there are four blocks of residential premises and the rest is industrial (no birds). A hundred and fifty-eight visits were made in the four residential blocks. Eighteen premises had birds, 77 premises did not have birds and in the remaining 63 premises there was nobody at home during the initial call (they will be visited again). Currently, we estimate the number of birds in the intensive surveillance area to be approximately 75. The intensive surveillance area is characterised by having no free-roaming birds or poultry. All birds and poultry are contained in sturdy fences which include covers over the tops of pens.

Based on this survey, we feel it is unlikely there will be more cases in this immediate area as a result of this outbreak.

The intensive surveillance area is under a hold order for the transport of birds. Poultry in this area will be purchased for diagnostic purposes.

## 2. State surveillance

State surveillance has been intensified. The current plan for surveillance is to increase the laboratory submissions from all premises within the State of California.

The commercial poultry industry, including egg producers, broiler producers, turkey producers and other poultry industries, has been notified through the California Poultry Industry Federation hotline and by direct phone contact with industry leaders. To reach small avian operations (commercial and hobby), a State surveillance system has been established for the specific purpose of encouraging laboratory submissions. Submissions are encouraged by not charging owners with fewer than 2,000 birds any fees for the service.

From the history and epidemiology of this outbreak, it would appear that the affected birds were detected within the first week of clinical signs.

The surveillance plan also includes contacting local feed stores, live bird markets, auction yards and flea markets looking for any evidence of disease, as well as for educational purposes. We are distributing literature and information to these contacts about increasing biosecurity. Observation of live bird markets and auction yards so far in the Fresno district have not resulted in any further evidence of the disease being detected.

**Control measures taken to date:** stamping-out policy. The disease is notifiable and importation is prohibited from infected countries.

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## CLASSICAL SWINE FEVER IN MOLDAVIA Lifting of sanitary measures

### FOLLOW-UP REPORT No. 2

*Translation of a fax received on 12 June 1998 from Dr V.M. Bahau, Chief Veterinary Officer, Ministry of Agriculture and Food, Kishinev:*

**End of previous report period:** 11 May 1998 (see *Disease Information*, **11** [19], 67, dated 15 May 1998).

**End of this report period:** 12 June 1998.

The situation in the small private farm at Vassileu has returned to normal. No new cases of disease or deaths in animals have been reported in or around this farm. In consequence, all quarantine restrictions have been lifted and the farm is considered as being free again from classical swine fever virus. Restrictions have also been lifted in the zone at risk.

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