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### BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY IN LUXEMBOURG Corrigendum

*Translation of a fax received on 5 December 1997 from Dr J. Kremer, Director of the Administration of Veterinary Services, Ministry of Agriculture, Viticulture and Rural Development, Luxembourg:*

Date of suspicion, previously stated to be 3 October 1997 (see *Disease Information*, **10** [48], 167), was in fact 13 October 1997.

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### HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA IN AUSTRALIA

#### Follow-up report No. 1

*Text of a fax received on 9 December 1997 from Dr G. Murray, Chief Veterinary Officer, Department of Primary Industries and Energy, Canberra:*

**End of previous report period:** 1 December 1997 (see *Disease Information*, **10** [48], 166-167).

**End of this report period:** 9 December 1997.

#### **New outbreaks:**

Location	No. of outbreaks
within the surveillance zone, about 3 km from the first infected property (31° 1' S - 150° 50' E, near Tamworth, State of New South Wales)	1

**Total number of outbreaks identified since 1 January 1997:** two (2).

**Description of affected population in the new outbreak:** hens producing fertile eggs for meat chickens.

#### **Total number of animals in the new outbreak:**

<b>susceptible</b>	<b>cases</b>	<b>deaths</b>	<b>destroyed</b>	<b>slaughtered</b>
aprox. 30,000 hens	...	...	30,000	0

**Diagnosis:** because of its proximity to the first infected farm, this property was subject to close surveillance. Infection was confirmed following investigation of a slight increase in mortality in one shed (2 per day to 22 per day).

- A. Diagnostic tests used:** fluorescent antibody testing of impression smears of pancreas; isolation of an influenza virus in inoculated embryonated eggs.
- B. Causal agent:** studies of the haemagglutinin (H) and neuraminidase (N) antigens have subtyped the virus as H7N4. It has an intravenous pathogenicity index (IVPI) of 2.54.

**Epidemiology:** early diagnosis has allowed destruction and disposal of birds on this property before significant levels of disease have developed.

- A. Source of agent / origin of infection:** the source of infection has not been confirmed, but it is presumed to be due to a mechanical transfer from the first infected farm via a truck used to collect and dispose of dead birds.
- B. Other epidemiological details:** eggs from this property have been delivered to a second hatchery near Sydney.

**Control measures during reporting period:**

- The second infected property was placed in quarantine on 3 December 1997.
- The restricted zone has been extended to include 3 km around the second infected farm.
- The surveillance zone has been extended to include 10 km around the second infected farm.
- All birds have been destroyed on both infected properties.
- Disinfection is well under way on the first property and has commenced on the second property.
- All eggs laid during the critical period prior to diagnosis on this property have been destroyed.
- Hatching eggs considered to be an epidemiological risk from the second property have been destroyed.
- A high level of surveillance is being maintained on all poultry enterprises within the restricted and surveillance zones.

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**AFRICAN SWINE FEVER IN TOGO  
Suspicion**

Follow-up report No. 1

*Translation of a fax received on 9 December 1997 from Dr A.M. Denke, Director of Animal Production and Fisheries, Ministry of Rural Development and Village Water Economy, Lomé:*

**End of previous report period:** 26 November 1997 (see *Disease Information*, **10** [47], 163).

**End of this report period:** 9 December 1997.

**New outbreak:**

Location	No. of outbreaks
6° 18' N - 1° 44 E	1

**Total number of animals in the new outbreak:**

<i>susceptible</i>	<i>cases</i>	<i>deaths</i>	<i>destroyed</i>	<i>slaughtered</i>
30,000	2,000	550	821	771

**Diagnosis:** samples taken from a pig in the identified outbreak were sent on 5 December 1997 by express mail to the Institute for Animal Health, Pirbright Laboratory (United Kingdom).

**Epidemiology:**

- A. Source of agent / origin of infection:** the carcasses of two dead animals, from the consignment of pigs from Benin unloaded in Djeta (see *Disease Information*, **10** [47], 163), were reportedly handled, and the guts left behind on the bank, where free-ranging pigs are raised.
- B. Other epidemiological details:** the outbreak would appear to be under control, since no cases have been reported in any other localities.

**Control measures during reporting period:** surveillance is being maintained in Djeta and along the Agokpamé-Agbanakin belt:

- Campaign to increase awareness of technical staff, smallholders/breeders, traders/transporters and pork butchers.
- Restrictions on the movement of pigs and porcine products (increased checks on trunk roads and link roads leading from the main outbreak).
- Systematic slaughter of pigs in the primary outbreak. Since the water table is very close to the surface in Djéta, slaughtered animals are incinerated.
- A state of maximum alert is in force in all the frontier posts bordering Benin (from north to south).

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### CLASSICAL SWINE FEVER IN NORWAY Suspicion

Emergency report

*Text of a fax received on 10 November 1997 from Dr G. Bakken, Chief Veterinary Officer, Royal Ministry of Agriculture, Oslo:*

**Nature of diagnosis:** post-mortem.

**Date of initial detection of animal health incident:** 9 December 1997.

<i>Location</i>	<i>No. of outbreaks</i>
County of Hedmark	1 (slaughterhouse)

**Diagnosis:** on 9 December 1997, classical swine fever was suspected in one pig at the post-mortem examination at a slaughterhouse. The pig was submitted to the National Veterinary Institute in Oslo for post-mortem examination. Based on this examination, classical swine fever could not be ruled out. Material was therefore submitted to the Reference Laboratory in Lindholm, Denmark, on 9 December.

**Epidemiology:** no sign suggestive of classical swine fever has been observed in the herd of origin, which only produces slaughter pigs.

**Control measures during reporting period:** the slaughterhouse has been cleansed and disinfected. The herd of origin is subjected to official restrictions and close monitoring by the District Veterinary Officer.

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## PORCINE REPRODUCTIVE AND RESPIRATORY SYNDROME IN COLOMBIA

### Emergency report

Translation of a communication received on 11 December 1997 from Dr M.A. Parra Parra, Director of Animal Health Division, Colombian Institute for Agriculture and Animal Production (ICA), Bogotá:

**Nature of diagnosis:** clinical, post-mortem and laboratory.

**Date of initial detection of animal health incident:** 15 June 1997.

Location	No. of outbreaks
department of Cundinamarca	2
department of Caldas	1

**Description of affected population:** pigs in commercial farms.

### Total number of animals in the outbreaks:

susceptible	cases	deaths	destroyed	slaughtered
11,000	860	110	0	0

**Diagnosis:** a country-wide serological survey found a positive reaction to the ELISA test (immunoenzymatic method) in 5.18% of farms using extensive rearing methods and 20.62% of intensive farms.

**A. Laboratory where diagnosis was made:** the diagnosis was made at the Centre for Research in Animal Health and Production (CEISA) del ICA, Santafé de Bogotá and was confirmed by the Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory, Plum Island, United States of America.

### B. Diagnostic tests used:

- washing of alveolar macrophages, followed by cultivation and direct immunofluorescence;
- virus isolation in MA-104 cells from tissues and macrophages;
- detection of antibodies by ELISA and direct immunofluorescence.

### Epidemiology:

**A. Source of agent / origin of infection:** the infection was probably due to the importation of infected piglets from countries where the disease is enzootic.

**B. Mode of spread:** probably through movements of infected animals within the country.

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