

# Good veterinary governance: definition, measurement and challenges

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## Summary

Good veterinary governance assumes the provision of veterinary services that are sustainably financed, universally available, and provided efficiently without waste or duplication, in a manner that is transparent and free of fraud or corruption. Good veterinary governance is a necessary condition for sustainable economic development inasmuch as it promotes the effective delivery of services and improves the overall performance of animal health systems. This article defines governance in Veterinary Services and proposes a framework for its measurement. It also discusses the role of Veterinary Services and analyses the governance dimensions of the performance-assessment tools developed by the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). These tools (OIE PVS Tool and PVS Gap Analysis) track the performance of Veterinary Services across countries (a harmonised tool) and over time (the PVS Pathway). The article shows the usefulness of the OIE PVS Tool for measuring governance, but also points to two shortcomings, namely (i) the lack of clear outcome indicators, which is an impediment to a comprehensive assessment of the performance of Veterinary Services, and (ii) the lack of specific measures for assessing the extent of corruption within Veterinary Services and the extent to which demand for better governance is being strengthened within the animal health system. A discussion follows on the drivers of corruption and instruments for perception-based assessments of country governance and corruption. Similarly, the article introduces the concept of *social accountability*, which is an approach to enhancing government transparency and accountability, and shows how *supply-side* and *demand-side* mechanisms complement each other in improving the governance of service delivery. It further elaborates on two instruments – *citizen report card surveys* and *grievance redress mechanisms* – because of their wider relevance and their possible applications in many settings, including Veterinary Services. Also, central to improving transparency and accountability is access to information and a discussion on the appropriate level of decentralisation of Veterinary Services. Bringing Veterinary Services into compliance with OIE international standards would contribute to improving governance and providing economic benefits through increased animal productivity, the expansion of trade and improved food security. It would also help to increase public health benefits, through greater food safety and better prevention and control of zoonoses.

## Keywords

Accountability – Chain of command – Citizen report card – Corruption – Decentralisation – Demand for better governance – Governance – Grievance mechanism – Performance – Public sector – Service delivery – Social accountability – Veterinary Services.

## Introduction

Livestock contributes 40% of the global value of agricultural production, employs 1.3 billion people, and supports the livelihood and food security of one billion of the world's poor, most of them living in rural areas of Africa and Asia. In many developing countries livestock rearing is a multifunctional activity. Beyond their direct role in generating food and income, livestock are a valuable asset, serving as a store of wealth, collateral for credit and an essential safety net during times of crisis. Livestock are also central to mixed farming systems. They consume waste products, produce manure for soil fertilisation and provide draught power for ploughing and transport. At the global level, livestock contribute 15% of total food energy and 25% of dietary protein. Products from livestock provide essential amino acids and micronutrients that are not easily obtained from plant-based food (8). Examples of such micronutrients include Vitamin B12, calcium, zinc and riboflavin, which have been proven to improve child development and school performance (2).

In recent decades, the livestock sector has also experienced spectacular development and expansion, driven by income growth and rapid urbanisation in the developing world and supported by technological change and innovation. The term 'Livestock Revolution' was introduced in the late 1990s to describe this unprecedented increase in the supply of and demand for animal products (7, 24). These structural changes in the livestock sector, combined with an intensification of production and increased trade in live animals and livestock products, have also been accompanied by rising environmental and public health risks. Emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases that have the potential to become pandemic occur with alarming regularity, and a substantial majority of these are zoonotic in origin – that is, transmissible from animals to humans (27). Other factors are contributing to this increase in the occurrence of infectious diseases, including demographic factors, such as urbanisation and the increase in human and animal population densities, sociological factors, such as an increase in movements of humans, animals and goods, and environmental factors, such as deforestation, habitat fragmentation and biodiversity loss. Degraded ecosystems with diminished biodiversity tend to favour opportunistic or generalist species, many of which are disease reservoirs. Moreover, changes in long-term and seasonal weather patterns have significant effects on key characteristics of disease behaviour, such as repartition of vectors, spreading patterns, diffusion range, and introduction and persistence in new habitats. On average, a new disease has emerged or re-emerged each year since the Second World War, and 75% of these have been zoonotic (16).

As well as having a catastrophic impact on human life and health, outbreaks of zoonotic disease can result in

enormous economic losses. The recent pandemics of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI H5N1) and influenza A (H1N1) were reminders of the persistent risk of emerging infectious zoonotic diseases and the economic losses they cause. Studies undertaken between 1997 and 2009 on the direct and indirect costs of six potential pandemics (Nipah Virus in Malaysia, West Nile fever in the USA, SARS in Asia, Canada and elsewhere, HPAI in Asia and Europe, bovine spongiform encephalopathy in the USA and the United Kingdom [UK], and Rift Valley fever in Tanzania, Kenya and Somalia) estimated the total economic losses to have been about US\$80 billion, equivalent to US\$6.7 billion per year (28). Other non-zoonotic highly contagious transboundary diseases, such as foot and mouth disease (FMD), can also have profound economic effects, not only for agriculture and the farming industry, but also for the tourism sector. For instance, the total cost of the FMD outbreaks in the UK in 2001 has been estimated at US\$9–13 billion (10, 11).



**Pandemic preparedness: simulation exercise in Vietnam**

Source: L. Msellati (2010)

In this context of more frequent emergence and re-emergence of high-profile animal and veterinary public health crises, improving animal health worldwide is a priority. Bringing Veterinary Services into compliance with World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) international standards would provide economic benefits, through increased animal productivity and trade and improved food security, as well as public health benefits, through greater food safety and better prevention and control of zoonoses. Good veterinary governance is essential to promoting effective delivery of services and improving the overall performance of animal health systems.


## What is good governance?

The concept of governance is not a new one. Early discussions go back to at least 400 BC, to the Arthashastra,

a treatise on governance, attributed to Kautilya, thought to have been the chief minister to the King of India. Kautilya presents key pillars of the ‘art of governance’, emphasising justice, ethics, and anti-autocratic tendencies. He states that the duty of the King is to protect the wealth of the state and its subjects and to enhance, maintain and safeguard this wealth as well as the interests of the kingdom’s subjects (12). Despite the long provenance of the concept, there is as yet no strong consensus around a single definition of governance (see Box 1) (20). Kaufman, Kray and Mastruzzi (2009) define governance as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced, the capacity to formulate and implement sound policies, and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them (14). While desirable for the economic and social prosperity of countries, these factors are not sufficient to ensure effective provision of public services.

In this article the authors use the concept of public sector governance to refer to how the state acquires and exercises the authority to provide and manage public goods and services (23). Good governance in the provision of public services requires enabling conditions: the existence of standards, information on performance, incentives for good governance, and accountability (see Box 2). Accountability is arguably the most important factor for good governance in (human) healthcare delivery (18), and it is just as important for good governance in animal health services. The 2004 World Bank World Development Report (WDR) defines the concept of accountability as a relationship among actors that has five features: delegation,

**Fig. 1**  
**The features of the relationships of accountability**



Source: World Bank, 2004 (22)

finance, performance, information about performance, and enforceability (see Fig. 1) (22). A relationship of accountability can be as simple as accepting a new job. In a typical employment relationship a person is given a set of tasks (delegation) and paid a wage (finance). The employee works (performance) and the contribution of the employee is assessed (information). Based on that information, the employer acts to reinforce good or discourage bad performance (enforceability). In the chain of service delivery the World Bank WDR distinguishes between four broad categories of actors:

- citizens/clients, such as voters, patients, students, parents, farmers, exporters
- politicians/policy-makers, such as ministers, parliamentarians, mayors

**Box 1**

**The many meanings of governance**

Governance is a complex concept that can have different meanings and definitions. Despite being widely used in the political, economic and financial context, there is no clear consensus on a single definition of governance. There is, however, some broad agreement on the general principles that characterise good governance.

- The United Nations Development Programme defines governance as the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority in the management of a country’s affairs at all levels. It also recognises nine good governance principles: participation, consensus orientation, strategic vision, responsiveness, effectiveness and efficiency, accountability, transparency, equity and the rule of law.
- For the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, governance denotes the use of political authority and the exercise of control in a society in relation to the management of its resources for social and economic development. This broad definition encompasses the role of public authorities in establishing the environment in which economic operators function and in determining the distribution of benefits as well as the relationship between the ruler and the ruled.
- For the European Union, good governance – in the context of a political and institutional environment that upholds human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law – is the transparent and accountable management of human, natural, economic and financial resources for the purposes of equitable and sustainable development. It entails clear decision-making procedures at the level of public authorities, transparent and accountable institutions, the primacy of law in the management and distribution of resources and capacity-building for designing and implementing measures, aiming in particular at preventing and combating corruption.
- For the World Bank, good governance is epitomised by predictable, open and enlightened policy-making (that is, transparent processes), a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos, an executive arm of government accountable for its actions, and a strong civil society participating in public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of law.

**Box 2**  
**Governance and performance fundamentals**

**Standards** are transparent and publicly known criteria or benchmarks used to assess and inform health policy, provision, and performance.

**Incentives** are any financial or non-financial factors that motivate a specific type of behaviour or action, and can be positive or negative, i.e. encourage a certain behaviour or deter it.

**Information** in the form of clear definitions of outputs and outcomes, combined with accurate data on performance and results collected at regular intervals, enables sanctions to be implemented when specified standards are not met.

**Accountability** refers to the act of holding public officials/service providers answerable for processes and outcomes and imposing sanctions if specified outputs and outcomes are not delivered.

*Source: Lewis & Pettersson, 2009 (18)*

- organisational providers, such as health departments, education departments, water and sanitation departments, livestock and veterinary departments
- frontline professionals, such as doctors, nurses, teachers, engineers, veterinarians and veterinary paraprofessionals.

In an ideal situation these actors are linked in relationships of power and accountability. Citizens exercise their voice and hold politicians to account, policy-makers have compacts with organisational providers, organisations manage frontline providers, and clients exercise client power through interactions with frontline providers (see Fig. 2) (22). Weaknesses in any of the relationships – or in the capacity of the actors – can result in service failures. Providers can be made directly accountable to clients (as in market transactions) by passing decisions and powers directly to citizens or

communities – a ‘short route’ of accountability. But, more typically, the public sector is involved and two key relationships – voice and compacts – make up the main control mechanism of the citizen in a ‘long route’ of accountability. In either case, organisations (such as health, education, and water departments) need to be able to manage frontline providers (22). This framework for thinking about governance issues as a way of improving the performance of public service delivery could be applicable to national Veterinary Services and could provide an effective tool for advancing good governance and performance in animal health.


## Good veterinary governance: measuring performance

### The role of Veterinary Services

The OIE defines Veterinary Services as: ‘the governmental and non-governmental organisations that implement animal health and welfare measures and other standards and recommendations in the *Terrestrial Code* and the *OIE Aquatic Animal Health Code* in the territory’ (32). Veterinary Services in OIE Member Countries must be under the control of a central Veterinary Authority, which is a governmental authority. The way the state organises and manages its Veterinary Services is central in the functioning of a country’s animal health system.

The role of Veterinary Services is to supervise veterinarians, veterinary paraprofessionals and private-sector organisations, to implement measures, to issue international veterinary certificates and to ensure compliance with international standards, so as to protect domestic and foreign animal health status. The Veterinary Authority heads and controls the services.

**Fig. 2**  
**Accountability in service delivery**



Source: World Bank, 2004 (22)

Good governance in Veterinary Services is crucial for sustainable economic development. It enables and stimulates public-private cooperation among all stakeholders along the value chains of animal products in implementing animal health policies that contribute to food security and safety and, ultimately, to growth and the fight against poverty. Well-governed Veterinary Services are those that are sustainably financed, universally available, provided efficiently without waste or duplication, and in a manner that is transparent and free of fraud or corruption.

Since 1996, the OIE's *Terrestrial Animal Health Code (Terrestrial Code)* has included guidelines for the governance of Veterinary Services (30, 32). It identifies the fundamental principles of quality for Veterinary Services, including: independence, impartiality, integrity, appropriate veterinary legislation and effective organisation, and the need for Veterinary Services to be capable of implementing animal health policies and measures and complying with international standards.

Good veterinary governance relies on strict adherence to the international standards that ensure the quality of Veterinary Services. Critical domains of activities defined under these standards and which could be considered as constituting the 'compact' element of governance (see Fig. 2) include: enforcement of veterinary law, surveillance of animal health, early detection of and rapid response to disease outbreaks, control of animal diseases at source and eradication (when possible), coordination and implementation of specific disease control programmes (including coordination and implementation of vaccination campaigns), and the establishment of public-private partnerships for sustainable animal health systems (including veterinary statutory bodies). In addition, core diagnostic tools have been developed to help calibrate the measures needed to strengthen Veterinary Services. Specific tools include analysis of the impact of animal diseases and the impact of animal health on food security, value chain analysis (including food chain approach and food safety), and review of the trade facilitation role of Veterinary Services.

### **Using the OIE Performance of Veterinary Services Tool to measure governance of Veterinary Services**

Measuring performance is critical to establishing benchmarks for efficiency, tracking changes in performance over time, assessing the effectiveness of public spending, and demonstrating the benefits of animal health programmes and policy reforms. Since 2006, the OIE has been using its Tool for the Evaluation of Performance of Veterinary Services in more than 110 Member Countries. This tool, together with the PVS Gap Analysis, is part of a global programme, the OIE

'PVS Pathway', for the sustainable improvement of the compliance of a country's Veterinary Services with OIE standards on the quality of Veterinary Services. The PVS Pathway is used to:

- assist Veterinary Services to establish their current level of performance
- identify gaps and weaknesses in their ability to comply with OIE international standards
- form a shared vision with stakeholders (including the private sector)
- establish priorities and carry out strategic initiatives (31).


The OIE PVS Tool assesses 46 'competencies' (areas of veterinary competence). Eleven of these competencies are related to veterinary governance:

- 1) technical independence
- 2) stability of structures and sustainability of policies
- 3) funding
- 4) coordination capability
- 5) capability to invest and develop
- 6) Veterinary Statutory Body
- 7) preparation and implementation of legislation and regulations
- 8) communications
- 9) consultation with stakeholders
- 10) implementation of joint programmes
- 11) transparency.

Each competency has five possible qualitative levels of advancement. Level one corresponds to the lowest level of achievement and level five to full compliance with OIE standards. The levels are cumulative – a higher level of advancement assumes that the Veterinary Services are complying with the requirements of the preceding levels.

A statistical analysis was carried out for this article, using a sample of 72 countries that had requested an OIE PVS evaluation between 2006 and 2009 (J. Commault, unpublished). The most important finding of the analysis was that there is a very strong and positive correlation between the eleven competencies related to governance: the level of one variable is very likely to be close to the level of other governance variables. Commault analysed the governance indicators of the sample countries using a hierarchical ascendant classification (a tool that identifies the most common profiles in a sample by grouping together the individuals that are similar in terms of indicators, i.e. that often have the same level of achievement for a given indicator). The analysis generated three distinct groups, each of which is very homogeneous in terms of levels. No group presents a high level of

**Fig. 3**  
Average levels of governance variables for each group of a classification in three classes (72 countries)



Source: J. Commault, 2011 (unpublished)

achievement for some competencies and a low level for others, which suggests that countries with such an uneven profile of competencies are rare and cannot constitute a group. The three groups are made up of countries that have approximately the same level for all competencies: four countries with frequent high levels of competency, 26 countries with generally high levels, and 42 countries with generally low levels of advancement in competencies. Figure 3 presents the mean level of achievement in each of these groups for each of the 11 competencies and illustrates this homogeneity. The circles on the graph are almost concentric, except for the axes 'Veterinary Statutory Body' and 'Stability of structures', and no group has high levels for some governance competencies and low levels for others. We can assume that the eleven competencies form a system in which the improvement of one aspect has positive effects on the others.

The authors undertook a multiple correspondence analysis using the 11 governance indicators as subjects and the 72 countries as variables, with five possible modalities corresponding to the five levels of the OIE PVS Tool. The analysis, which regroups the competencies that have similar values in each country, shows that the eleven competencies related to veterinary governance can be broken down into four distinct areas of veterinary governance:

– **transparency**, which includes 'Transparency' and 'Coordination of the Veterinary Services'. The former corresponds to external transparency (i.e. to the ability of countries to notify the OIE and stakeholders), and the latter to internal transparency (i.e. to the distribution of roles between the different bodies involved, the presence/absence of a power struggle and the quality of internal communication). It is interesting to note that the two are congruent

– **outreach**, which includes 'Implementation of joint programmes', 'Consultation with stakeholders' and 'Communications'. This corresponds to the capacity

of Veterinary Services to engage, consult and communicate with stakeholders to formulate and implement joint programmes in the area of animal health and food safety

– **financing**, which includes 'Funding' and 'Capability of Veterinary Services to invest and develop'. This corresponds to the capacity of Veterinary Services to access financial resources for their continued operations and investments, independent of political pressure

– **independence**, which includes the 'Technical independence' of the Veterinary Services. This corresponds to the ability of Veterinary Services to carry out their duties with autonomy and freedom from commercial, financial, hierarchical and political influences that may affect technical decisions in a manner contrary to the provisions of the OIE (and of the World Trade Organization Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, where applicable).

Commault also examines the relationships between the eleven competencies related to governance, the *per capita* gross domestic product (GDP) and the importance of the livestock sector, the assumption being that better governance of Veterinary Services is associated with higher production and export. Logistic regressions of the governance competencies against the *per capita* GDP and some variables describing the livestock sector – the quantity of meat, milk and eggs produced and the value of exported meat, dairy products and eggs – are run to measure these correlations, with a control for the population and the area of the country. The results show, first, that for most competencies, there is a significant and positive correlation between the level of competency and the *per capita* GDP. Second, production and export of meat, dairy products and eggs also present significantly positive coefficients. These results indicate that some competencies appear to be positively correlated with the level of production and of export of livestock-derived food. The estimated coefficients are particularly high when

**Table I**  
**Logistic regressions of governance competencies**

Livestock sector variables	Estimated coefficients					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
<i>Per capita</i> GDP	1.2596	1.0583	1.1705	3.8977***	0.9228***	4.5255***
Arable land	0.2302	-0.3874	0.3509	0.3515	0.3426	0.6587**
Population	-0.7741	0.0524	-1.1323	0.2042	-0.5518	-0.8229
Egg production	0.2876	0.1876	0.7874*	-0.2190	1.3022*	1.4617*
Dairy production	0.0145	0.1182	-0.00352	-0.5082	0.00940	0.7897
Meat production	2.8662*	0.0125	2.5363	0.4363	0.4559	5.5355***
Dairy/egg export	1.3992***	0.0972	1.1195***	0.9635***	1.0831***	1.7617***
Meat export	8.4318***	-0.0279	3.5673	0.3459	0.3414	8.2894***
	7	8	9	10	11	
<i>Per capita</i> GDP	2.6837**	1.4431	2.3087	6.2647***	2.2385*	
Arable land	0.1037	-0.2112	0.1902	-0.1491	0.4033*	
Population	0.6260	-0.4028	-0.7238	0.9838	-0.2532	
Egg production	0.1242	0.5932	1.0876	0.5245	0.4801*	
Dairy production	0.2757	-0.0545	0.3322	0.5847	0.4794	
Meat production	0.3311	0.3154	0.4904	2.7197*	1.9680	
Dairy/egg export	0.6835***	0.6293**	1.0606***	1.1054***	0.7748***	
Meat export	0.2827	0.2735	0.4243*	7.0235***	6.6087***	

GDP: gross domestic product

1. Consultation with stakeholders; 2. Veterinary Statutory Body; 3. Implementation of joint programmes; 4. Legislation; 5. Transparency; 6. Capability to invest and develop; 7. Technical independence; 8. Stability of structures and sustainability of policies; 9. Coordination capability; 10. Funding; 11. Communications

\* 10% significance of the estimation

\*\* 5% significance of the estimation

\*\*\* 1% significance of the estimation

For each competency, the authors ran two regressions, one excluding the production variables and one excluding the export variables, this in order to avoid too much correlation between the regressors

considering meat production and exports, though only significant for a smaller number of competencies (Table I). This could be an indication that, in the countries that are meat producers and exporters, the development of livestock production and trade may create an incentive to strengthen the Veterinary Services. A comparable result was previously highlighted in a study on the ‘Cost of National Prevention Systems (NPS) for Animal Diseases and Zoonoses in Developing and Transition Countries’ (1). The study carried out in nine OIE Member Countries (i.e. Costa Rica, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Morocco, Romania, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay and Vietnam) showed that there is a close relationship between GDP and the level of total public expenditures for NPS. Differences in GDP explain to a large degree the variation in NPS expenditures. This may lead to a significant underfunding of the NPS, most notably in low-income countries. In these cases, Veterinary Services require a higher priority in the national budget allocation, and/or sustained external support to be able to address global animal health challenges effectively. At the end of the analysis, Commault attempts to evaluate the influence of veterinary governance on outcomes (including poverty reduction); however, the results are not convincing due to

the difficulty of obtaining reliable data on Veterinary Services outcomes.

While the previous analysis shows the usefulness of the OIE PVS Tool for measuring governance it also points to two shortcomings. First, the lack of clear outcome indicators associated with the use of the OIE PVS Tool does not allow for a comprehensive assessment over time of the performance of the Veterinary Services. More broadly, the absence of a results framework limits the ability of the Veterinary Services, and their line ministry, to demonstrate the economic and public health benefits of improved service delivery and policy reforms. Second, the competencies of the OIE PVS Tool, which have mainly (and legitimately so) been conceived to measure country-level compliance of Veterinary Services with OIE standards, do not take into account fully the various dimensions of good governance. The next sections present two ways of addressing these issues: (i) establishing transparent and monitorable results frameworks and (ii) enhancing the OIE PVS Tool in the area of governance. This is followed by a section which focuses on the issue of decentralisation in Veterinary Services.

## Establishing transparent and monitorable results frameworks

The main difficulty in assessing the governance status of Veterinary Services using the OIE PVS Tool is the lack of clear outcome indicators that would make it possible to measure performance better by linking a certain level of competencies and funding to measurable results. For example, measuring the decline in the number of outbreaks, the improvement in the animal health status or the preservation of the disease-free status for a particular disease requires well-performing Veterinary Services and transparent reporting at the country level. The difficulty in distinguishing between the real absence of a disease in a country and the inability (unwillingness) of Veterinary Services to detect and report it in accordance with international requirements is all too well known by practitioners. In addition, the intrinsic epidemiological status of the country depends on numerous exogenous parameters, such as the animal health situation in neighbouring countries and the geographical position of the country (e.g. climate and natural barriers). Nevertheless, it is possible to develop intermediary outcome indicators to measure, for instance, management and budget efficiency, service coverage, transparency orientation (i.e. level of commitment to transparency) and user satisfaction, or better compliance with international standards. The OIE could contribute to the development of such outcome indicators, beginning with helping Member Countries to devise transparent and monitorable results frameworks, which could eventually be aggregated in the medium term to provide cross-country comparisons.

More broadly, because it produces information on projected inputs, outputs and outcomes, a strong result-based framework at the sector level provides a foundation for increased accountability and improved governance (3). Sound sectoral results frameworks also help to raise the profile of Veterinary Services and to facilitate the dialogue of line ministries with their colleagues from ministries of finance and planning, and are a central feature of the new aid effectiveness agenda.

## Enhancing the OIE PVS Tool in the area of governance

Another shortcoming of the OIE PVS Tool is the lack of specific direct indicators (competencies) to assess good governance, including, for instance, indicators of corruption and of demand for better governance. The literature has developed numerous governance indicators that can be categorised as rule based or outcome based (6). Rule-based indicators assess whether institutions generally presumed to be associated with good governance, such as anti-corruption commissions, are in

place. Identifying relevant measures that are clearly linked to positive outcomes and easily observed by outsiders would make assessment of governance status and progress easier. However, a frequently mentioned drawback is that a large number of indicators may be needed to approximate the complexity of 'real world' situations, and that having rules on paper often says little about the extent and quality of their application. Outcome-based indicators, by contrast, focus on either broad citizen perceptions (the extent to which users perceive public services to be easily accessed and responsive to their needs) or expert opinion about the *de facto* implementation of rules. While outcome-based indicators provide a more differentiated picture, they are normally more costly to measure and less actionable from a policy perspective. In practice, outcome and rule-based indicators can complement each other.

Empirically-based indicators of aggregate governance, combining both rule-based and outcome-based indicators, at the sector level are now widely applied as tools for decision-makers and to point to specific areas of needed reform. This is the case in the land sector where a Land Governance Assessment Framework (LGAF) has been developed by the World Bank in partnership with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), UN Habitat, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the International Food Policy Research Institute, the African Union and bilateral partners. The LGAF, which is used in more than 20 countries, is a diagnostic tool for assessing the status of land governance at the country level. It focuses on five key areas (rights recognition and enforcement; land use planning, land management, and taxation; management of public land; public provision of land information; dispute resolution and conflict management) and helps put in place a structure and process to systematically track progress in improving land governance over time (see Box 3, 6). The application of LGAF in five pilot countries (Ethiopia, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Peru and Tanzania) has facilitated identification of gaps in the land policy framework and deficiencies in the way in which institutions function. It also has provided a basis for monitoring discrete (rule-based) indicators of policy reform (5). A similar framework was developed by the World Bank for analysing governance in the forestry sector and improving countries' capacity to understand critical governance issues in the sector (26). Similar tools could be adapted to animal health and tested for eventual dissemination to OIE Member Countries to be used as an optional module within the PVS Tool.

International commitments provide another way of strengthening sectoral governance. The Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of



Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security are one such international commitment. Prepared by FAO, these voluntary guidelines were endorsed by the Committee on World Food Security in 2012 (9). The purpose of these voluntary guidelines is to serve as a reference and to provide guidance to improve the governance of land, fisheries and forests. They are also intended to contribute to the global and national efforts to eradicate hunger and poverty, based on the principles of sustainable development and with the recognition of the centrality of land to development, by promoting secure land tenure rights and equitable access to land, fisheries and forests. Similar guidelines on veterinary governance would help strengthen global governance of animal health systems, which is the responsibility of all governments and depends on the solidarity principle at the core of the OIE mission.

## The issue of decentralisation in Veterinary Services

Decentralisation – the transfer of political, administrative and fiscal authority to a lower level of government – brings the promise of making policy and delivery of services more responsive to the needs of the often disenfranchised people in rural areas (25). In the case of Veterinary Services, however, not all functions can or should be decentralised. The *principle of subsidiarity* provides the basis for identifying appropriate levels of decentralisation. Controlling animal infectious diseases and zoonoses, for example, are functions that are better addressed at the national level, even though implementation requires considerable administrative capacity at sub-national and local levels. During an animal health crisis there is a need for a clear and direct chain of command and stream of

### Box 3

#### The Land Governance Assessment Framework

The Land Governance Assessment Framework (LGAF), developed by the World Bank in partnership with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, UN Habitat, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the International Food Policy Research Institute, the African Union, and bilateral partners, is a diagnostic tool for assessing the status of land governance at country level in a participatory process of 4–6 months that draws systematically on local expertise and existing evidence rather than on outsiders. It focuses on five key areas (rights recognition and enforcement; land use planning, land management, and taxation; management of public land; public provision of land information; dispute resolution and conflict management).

This process helps to establish a consensus and priority actions on (a) gaps in existing evidence; (b) areas for regulatory or institutional change, piloting of new approaches, and interventions to improve land governance on a broader scale (e.g. by strengthening land rights and improving their enforcement); and (c) criteria to assess the effectiveness of these measures.

The LGAF process is guided by a framework of 21 land governance indicators in the five key areas listed above, each divided into 3–4 dimensions for which rankings are assigned by expert panels based on pre-coded answers. Pilot experience shows that this use of a consistent framework facilitates transfer of good practice across countries. Implementation is in a number of discrete steps that are overseen by a country coordinator, a well-respected and impartial person with extensive knowledge of the sector.

**Preparation and background documentation:** The first phase of the process aims at building ownership in the government, identifying the team. It also aims at providing the common basis of information that is indispensable as a basis of consensus on rankings or priority actions, including a tenure typology, relevant material from existing studies, and panel briefings.

**Expert panels:** Intensive work sessions of between half a day and a day per topic are organised for panels consisting of 3–6 subject-matter experts and users of land systems. The material from panel minutes is then synthesised by the country coordinator to form a country report.

**Validation and policy workshop:** The country report is reviewed by international experts and then presented at a national workshop, which will validate the results and prioritise policy conclusions and associated monitoring indicators for presentation to key policy-makers during a policy workshop. Ideally, this will result in agreement on follow-up actions, some of which can be supported by development partners.

Initial experience shows that, even in highly complex situations with weak land governance, the technical and participatory nature of the process – which puts existing information into a strategic context and prioritises information needs in light of desired policy outcomes – helped provide an unbiased assessment of the sector and an agreement on next steps that is backed by stakeholders. Results are feeding into policy discussion, including the design of Development Policy Operations, the design of land regularisation pilots, and are being built on and taken forward by operations to improve processes for land administration and large-scale land-related investment.

Source: Deininger K. *et al.*, 2012 (6)

communications to make and enforce decisions in the shortest time possible and to avoid conflicting messages. Similarly, national analysis of the health situation and timely reporting requires a unified reporting system that is best managed by the central authority for the whole national territory. Lastly, all functions oriented abroad, such as international export certification and ensuring compliance with international import standards to protect domestic and foreign agriculture, fall under the responsibility of a central authority.

## Good veterinary governance: curbing corruption in service delivery

Today, corruption (i.e. the use of public office for private gains) arguably has become one of the most challenging obstacles to economic development. Empirical research on governance and anti-corruption has made major strides in the past decades, providing increasing evidence that corruption inhibits poverty reduction efforts and retards economic growth. Borrowing a term from the public and animal health professions, corruption is a 'social pandemic' (3). The formula below, based on Klitgaard's drivers of corruption, provides a simple framework for analysing corruption (17).

***M (monopoly) + D (discretion) – A (accountability) – T (transparency) = C (corruption)***

The argument is that an organisation is more likely to experience corruption when it has monopoly power over the provision of a good or service, the discretion to decide who will receive it and how much they will receive, and no accountability for the outcome. Linked to all three drivers is the aspect of transparency, which has been added to Klitgaard's original formula. Increased transparency constrains monopoly power and the unrestrained use of discretion and is essential to instilling accountability among decision-makers (3). The early 1990s witnessed the emergence of cross-country, perception-based assessments of country governance and corruption. The Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, the best known and most referenced corruption index to date, began publishing its annual survey in 1995. Similarly, by the mid-1990s, the World Bank Institute had developed a more comprehensive data set covering cross-country governance indicators, known as the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (15). The WGI, which have been used to assess over 200 countries since 1996, consist of six composite indicators of broad dimensions of governance:

- voice and accountability
- political stability and absence of violence/terrorism
- government effectiveness
- regulatory quality
- rule of law
- control of corruption.


These indicators are based on several hundred variables obtained from 31 different data sources, capturing governance perceptions as reported by survey respondents, non-governmental organisations, commercial business information providers and public sector organisations worldwide (visit [www.govindicators.org](http://www.govindicators.org) for the latest information from 215 countries). With the aid of these data sets, researchers have made major strides in quantifying the macro impact of corruption.

The WGI were used in the 2008 World Development Report 'Agriculture for Development'. The report recognises agriculture as one of the most promising instruments for reducing world poverty and, at the same time, identifies governance as an essential element in realising the agriculture-for-development agenda (25). The report identifies three distinct worlds in which agriculture operates:

- agriculture-based countries, where agriculture is the basis for economic growth
- transforming countries with rapidly rising rural/urban disparities and continuing extreme rural poverty, where a comprehensive approach that pursues multiple pathways out of poverty is necessary
- urbanised countries, where agriculture can help reduce remaining rural poverty if smallholders become direct suppliers in modern food markets and jobs are created in the agro-industry.

Figure 4 shows that governance problems tend to be more severe in agriculture-based countries, where the state is especially important for addressing market failures. These countries are often afflicted by conflicts, which aggravate the governance issues posed by political and economic instability, limited voice and accountability, low state capacity, corruption, and poor rule of law. Conflict also increases the risk of food crises and disease outbreaks, for both humans and animals.

At the sector level, numerous studies have been carried out using a value chain approach to identify specific areas where reforms may have the greatest impact on preventing and reducing corruption. A sector produces certain outputs through a sequence of well-defined activities. In the absence of an animal health sectoral study, the



Source: Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2006 (13)

**Fig. 4**  
**Using Worldwide Governance Indicators to assess governance in agriculture-based, transforming, urbanised and developed countries**

The governance indicators aggregate the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in developed and developing countries

pharmaceutical sector offers a good example of such a value chain approach (4). The consequences of corruption within the pharmaceutical system are dramatic, from both public health and economic points of view. If quality control regulations are not sufficient or are not implemented or enforced, grave health and economic consequences can result. At worst, contaminated production processes or unsafe counterfeit drugs can lead to severe health consequences, including death. Capture of the pharmaceutical regulatory system can result in public spending on medicines that is not necessarily rational – in terms of criteria of appropriateness, safety, effectiveness and economy – and does not necessarily reflect the health priorities of a country. While corruption in the pharmaceutical system can affect a country’s entire population, it is typically the poor that are most likely to experience its detrimental effects. The pharmaceutical system is susceptible to fraud and corruption for a variety of reasons. First, the sale of pharmaceutical products is lucrative, which makes the illegal sale of counterfeit, substandard, unregistered or stolen drugs particularly attractive. Second, the pharmaceutical industry is subject to a significant degree of government regulation, which, without proper transparency and accountability frameworks, can be subject to regulatory capture and permit individual deviance from norms. A third reason why the pharmaceutical industry is vulnerable to fraud and corruption is that the supply chain is extremely complex. The value-chain approach facilitates understanding of the structure of the sector, distinguishing the various actors and their motivations, and identifying the key points where corruption can occur. In the pharmaceutical sector, corruption can occur in various forms at each of the following critical decision points: manufacturing,

registration, selection, procurement, distribution, and pharmaceutical prescribing and dispensing.

Veterinary Services are not exempt from corruption and, as in other sectors, the effects of weak governance are particularly harmful for the poor in developing countries, for whom livestock is a primary means of generating a livelihood, a key vehicle for investing, accumulating and transmitting wealth to the next generations, and very often an integral part of their identity. Box 4 presents some examples of corruption that could occur with Veterinary Services. The experience in

**Box 4**  
**Examples of Veterinary Services corruption**

Corruption in Veterinary Services reflects the range of corruption seen throughout society. There is petty corruption and grand, administrative and political corruption, and bribery in many forms. The following are typical reported and alleged incidents:

- public officials extort payments for services that the state ought to supply at a nominal fee
- to avoid delay in issuance of veterinary certificates, a producer or an exporter bribes public officials
- public official take bribes to ignore violations of sanitary laws
- public officials take bribes to allow export of endangered animal species
- a public official demands that his or her subordinates pay him or her kickbacks for salary increases and promotions
- payments for jobs
- public officials siphon money off donor-sponsored projects for personal enrichment
- procurement
- ghost workers.

combating corruption and raising performance in healthcare delivery allows lessons to be drawn about solutions that could be applicable to Veterinary Services, e.g. putting in place effective incentives, increasing oversight and introducing accountability mechanisms (18). There is a vast menu of solutions for improving budget and resource management, improving the performance of individual veterinary staff and of the Veterinary Services as a whole, increasing user satisfaction, and reducing the perception of corruption. Harnessing technology, such as e-procurement and integrated information systems for procurement and inventory management, creates new mechanisms for improving efficiency, strengthening internal controls and discouraging corruption. Transparent recruitment, assignment and promotion systems help reduce the scope of fraudulent practices. Combining financial and non-financial incentives contributes to improving the performance of staff. Figure 5, based on focus groups and interviews with health workers, illustrates the range of non-financial incentives that can influence performance (18). In all these areas, promoting community and citizen participation contributes to improved accountability in the delivery of public services. The next section discusses this point in more detail.

**Fig. 5**  
**Non-financial incentives reported by health workers in focus groups**

Non-financial incentives		
Career development prospects	Professional recognition	Supervisor feedback
Continuing education and training	Resource and equipment availability	Work environment

Source: Lewis & Pettersson, 2009 (18)

## Strengthening the demand for better governance

When used to analyse the status of the governance of Veterinary Services in a particular country, the PVS Tool focuses on the supply side of delivery, with interventions aiming mainly at improving delivery capacity in terms of personal skills, resources (including both capital and financial resources), and management processes and systems. International experience in the area of governance in service delivery shows that supply-side interventions may be more effective when matched with demand-side mechanisms in which those using the services (e.g. civil society and user groups) are evaluating their quality, effectiveness and governance, and actively providing oversight on these aspects. Examples in the education sector suggest establishing an education information

management system (a supply-side intervention) and engaging parents at the community level in school management (a demand-side mechanism) as a means of reducing teacher absenteeism. In Indonesia, the Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) illustrates the potential effectiveness of community monitoring combined with a complaints redress system to bring improvements in the delivery of water and sanitation services in rural areas. These are examples of the concept of social accountability, which is an approach to enhancing government transparency and accountability (19). There is a wide range of citizen actions to hold the state to account as well as actions on the part of government, media and other actors that promote or facilitate these efforts. Access to information is central to improving transparency and accountability: policy-makers need information to do their job well and citizens need information to exercise their rights fully, hence the emphasis that certain countries put on freedom of information. Social accountability strategies and tools help empower ordinary citizens to exercise their inherent rights and to hold governments accountable for the use of public funds and how they exercise authority. Global experience has shown that such initiatives can be catalytic and that they increasingly play a critical role in securing and sustaining governance reforms that strengthen transparency and accountability. Over the past decades, a wide range of social accountability practices has been developed and tested in countries such as Brazil, India, Indonesia and South Africa, including, but not limited to:

- participatory budgeting
- participatory performance monitoring
- social audits
- social impact assessment
- public hearings
- community radio
- transparency portals
- citizen report card surveys
- citizen charters
- grievance redress mechanisms
- ombudsmen.

Two of these tools are explained in more detail below because of their wider relevance and their possible application in many settings, including Veterinary Services: citizen report card surveys and grievance redress mechanisms.

### Citizen report card surveys

The seminal work of Samuel Paul and the Public Affairs Centre in Bangalore, India, opened the way for exploring the potential of using citizen feedback on the government's functions, especially its provision of public services, as a

means of improving performance and responsiveness (21). The method and approach first used in Bangalore are based on the observation that many people, in particular in the developing world, are concerned about the erosion in government accountability and performance in the delivery of public services. Users of a service can tell local government a lot about the quality and value of services. Further, the timely publication of that feedback creates incentives for service providers to perform, and can allow more transparent comparisons of service quality among providers. Hence the development of a report card on public services, which is not just one more opinion poll but reflects the actual experience of people and their satisfaction with a wide range of public services. The survey on which a report card is based covers only those who have had experiences in the use of specific services, interactions with the relevant public agencies, or other aspects of public services and refers to facts that the respondents are able to recall. Users possess fairly accurate information on whether a public agency failed to solve their problems or whether they had to pay bribes to officials. Since the same people are often customers of different services and deal with the public agencies involved, their satisfaction scores can be used to compare and rank these agencies. When a report card is used for benchmarking by repeating the exercise over time, it may help agency leaders to assess the improvement or deterioration in their services. A Training Kit on the Report Card Approach is available from the Public Affairs Centre in Bangalore ([www.pacindia.org/publications/tool-kits/](http://www.pacindia.org/publications/tool-kits/)). The kit describes the various steps in planning and organising a report card study, including sampling procedures, basics of instrument design, frameworks for analysis and dissemination of findings and advocacy. It is also important to note that the concept of report cards and client surveys may be new to many governments and their agencies, but firms operating in a competitive environment routinely make use of these tools in many countries. In the case of veterinary healthcare the standards or norms of service may not be known to the livestock owner, and therefore would have to be articulated and published.

### Grievance redress mechanisms

As part of social accountability, government agencies increasingly resort to grievance redress mechanisms as a trusted way of resolving concerns raised by citizens and communities. Grievance mechanisms can be defined as dispute mechanisms that are non-judicial in nature, meaning that they are not resolved within a court of law. According to an advisory note of the Office of the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman of the World Bank, grievance mechanisms provide an effective avenue for expressing concerns, achieving remedies and promoting a mutually constructive relationship (29). This advisory note offers practical guidance to assist in the design and

implementation of effective project-level grievance mechanisms, which could be extended to government agencies and applied more specifically to Veterinary Services. A well-functioning grievance mechanism:

- provides a predictable, transparent, and credible process to all parties, resulting in outcomes that are seen as fair, effective, and lasting
- builds trust as an integral component of broader community relations activities
- enables more systematic identification of emerging issues and trends, facilitating corrective action and pre-emptive engagement.

In its simple form, the functioning of a grievance mechanism can be broken down into the following primary steps or actions:

- receive and register a complaint
- screen and assess the complaint
- formulate a response
- select a resolution approach
- implement the approach
- settle the issues
- track and evaluate results
- learn from the experience
- communicate back to all parties involved.

Good practices for grievance mechanisms involve diverse methods for submitting a complaint, including self-identified, confidential, or anonymous procedures (e.g. professional letter writers, suggestion boxes, mail-in forms, toll-free telephone numbers, and electronic submission through an agency website). A central point of contact should also be available to receive complaints and log them into a central register. In addition, designated complaint-resolution staff, consisting of both male and female employees, should accept complaints, provide relevant information on the process, discuss the complainants' situations with them, and explore possible approaches for resolution. A well-performing grievance mechanism at the central or sub-national level of Veterinary Services would be an important contributor to improving the overall performance in service delivery and ultimately user satisfaction, in terms of, for instance, the availability, timeliness and cost-effectiveness of services.

A citizen report card survey is a tool that can be used by Veterinary Services to complement the OIE PVS Tool and provide information on the perception of the quality of the service and on the level of satisfaction of users. The PVS Tool itself could also be modified to include a competency relating to how well Veterinary Services use grievance redress mechanisms. This competency, which could be included in the 'Interaction with stakeholders' section,

would facilitate assessment of the way in which Veterinary Services allow service users to voice their priorities and concerns. Such a competency could, therefore, serve as a proxy for measuring the transparency and accountability of Veterinary Services.

## Conclusions

Good governance in Veterinary Services is crucial for sustainable economic development. Good governance of animal health systems enables and stimulates public-private cooperation among all stakeholders along the animal product value chains in implementing animal health policies that contribute to food security and safety and, ultimately, to growth and the fight against poverty. The OIE PVS Tool gives some preliminary indications on the governance status of Veterinary Services. However, the animal health sector, like other sectors, is under increasing national and international pressures for greater transparency and accountability. In this context, it is essential for governments to deepen their understanding of the drivers and challenges of good veterinary governance by exploring the demand side of delivery and measuring the extent of potential corruption.

This article makes the case for a modular approach, where the core assessment of Veterinary Services performance (PVS Pathway) could be complemented by developing new indicators or tools (including governance assessment frameworks specific to the animal health sector) and implementing social accountability strategies to empower ordinary citizens to exercise their inherent rights and to hold governments accountable for the use of public funds.

Accountability is arguably the most important factor for good governance in Veterinary Services, which requires sound, transparent and monitorable results frameworks. Ultimately, under the OIE solidarity principle, a country that demonstrated real improvement in governance over a certain period of time would likely be better placed to attract higher levels of national and foreign funding for further strengthening of Veterinary Services.

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## Bonne gouvernance vétérinaire : définition, évaluation et défis

L. Msellati, J. Commault & A. Dehove

### Résumé

Les Services vétérinaires bien gouvernés correspondent à des services qui sont financés de manière pérenne, qui sont universellement accessibles, et qui sont fournis avec efficacité, sans gaspillage ni duplication, d'une manière transparente et indemne de fraude et de corruption. L'existence d'une bonne gouvernance vétérinaire est un facteur indispensable au développement économique durable, dans la mesure où elle favorise l'efficacité de la prestation de services et améliore les performances générales des systèmes de santé animale. Après avoir défini la gouvernance des Services vétérinaires, les auteurs proposent un cadre permettant de l'évaluer. Ils examinent également le rôle des Services vétérinaires ainsi que les outils mis au point par l'Organisation mondiale de la santé animale (OIE) pour évaluer les performances de ces Services. Ces outils (outil PVS de l'OIE et analyse des écarts PVS) permettent de retracer les performances des Services vétérinaires dans différents pays (il s'agit d'outils harmonisés) et au fil du temps (via le Processus PVS). Tout en montrant l'utilité de l'Outil PVS pour évaluer la gouvernance, les auteurs constatent l'existence de deux lacunes : (i) l'absence d'indicateurs de résultats clairs, ce qui est un obstacle à l'évaluation intégrale des performances des Services vétérinaires ; (ii) l'absence de mesures spécifiques pour évaluer l'ampleur de la corruption au sein des Services vétérinaires et pour déterminer jusqu'à quel point la demande relative à une meilleure gouvernance se renforce au sein du système de santé animale. Les auteurs examinent ensuite les facteurs de corruption ainsi que les instruments d'évaluation perceptive de la gouvernance nationale et de la corruption. De même, ils introduisent le concept de *responsabilisation sociale*, démarche consistant à améliorer la transparence et la responsabilité gouvernementales, et expliquent la façon dont les *mécanismes impulsés par l'offre* et ceux *impulsés par la demande* interagissent et se complètent pour améliorer la gouvernance de la prestation de services. Deux instruments sont décrits de manière plus poussée, à savoir les *questionnaires citoyens* et les *mécanismes de règlement de différends*, instruments dont la portée dépasse le cadre strict de la gouvernance mais qui peuvent trouver de nombreuses applications dans divers contextes, y compris les Services vétérinaires. De même, l'accès à l'information et la conduite d'une réflexion sur le degré approprié de décentralisation des Services vétérinaires s'avèrent centrales pour améliorer transparence et responsabilité. La mise en conformité des Services vétérinaires avec les normes internationales de l'OIE contribue à améliorer la gouvernance et s'avère également bénéfique pour l'économie, car elle entraîne un accroissement de la productivité des élevages, un élargissement des débouchés commerciaux et une amélioration de la sécurité alimentaire. Cette mise en conformité des Services vétérinaires est également bénéfique pour la santé publique, dans la mesure où elle contribue à l'amélioration de la sécurité sanitaire des aliments ainsi qu'au renforcement de la prévention et du contrôle des zoonoses.

### Mots-clés

Chaîne de commandement – Corruption – Décentralisation – Demande relative à une meilleure gouvernance – Gouvernance – Mécanisme de règlement des différends – Performance – Prestation de services – Questionnaires citoyens – Responsabilisation sociale – Responsabilité – Secteur public – Services vétérinaires.



## Buena gobernanza veterinaria: definición, cuantificación y dificultades

L. Msellati, J. Commault & A. Dehove

### Resumen

La idea de “buena gobernanza veterinaria” remite a la prestación de servicios veterinarios de carácter universal, dotados de financiación a largo plazo y prestados con eficacia (sin derroches ni redundancias), transparencia y sin posibilidad de fraude o corrupción. La buena gobernanza veterinaria es condición necesaria para un desarrollo económico sostenible, en la medida en que promueve la prestación eficaz de servicios y mejora el rendimiento general de los sistemas de sanidad animal. Los autores definen la gobernanza aplicada a los Servicios Veterinarios y propone un sistema para cuantificarla. Además, examina el papel de los Servicios Veterinarios y analiza los aspectos de gobernanza presentes en las herramientas de evaluación de la eficacia elaboradas por la Organización Mundial de Sanidad Animal (OIE). Esos instrumentos (la herramienta PVS y el análisis de brechas, de la OIE) sirven para analizar la eficacia de los Servicios Veterinarios en distintos países (herramienta armonizada) y a lo largo del tiempo (Proceso PVS). El autor demuestra la utilidad de la herramienta PVS de la OIE para cuantificar la gobernanza, aunque también señala dos de sus limitaciones: (i) la falta de indicadores de resultados claros, lo que dificulta una evaluación global de la eficacia de los Servicios Veterinarios; y (ii) la falta de medidas específicas para evaluar el grado de corrupción presente en los Servicios Veterinarios y hasta qué punto, dentro de un sistema de sanidad animal, se abunda en la exigencia de mejor gobernanza. El autor examina después los factores que alientan la corrupción y los instrumentos para evaluar el sentir general dentro de un país en relación con el buen gobierno y la corrupción. En el mismo orden de ideas, también presenta el concepto de “responsabilidad social”, que sirve para mejorar el nivel de transparencia y rendición de cuentas de las administraciones públicas, y explica cómo los mecanismos “de demanda” y los “de oferta” se complementan entre sí a la hora de mejorar la gobernanza en la prestación de servicios. Después profundiza en dos instrumentos concretos (los *estudios de tarjetas de puntuación ciudadana* y los *mecanismos de atención de reclamaciones*) que pueden aplicarse con gran amplitud y en muchos contextos, comprendido el de los Servicios Veterinarios. Otro aspecto capital para mejorar la transparencia y la rendición de cuentas es el acceso a la información y la existencia de un debate sobre el grado idóneo de descentralización de los Servicios Veterinarios. El cumplimiento de las normas internacionales de la OIE por los Servicios Veterinarios contribuiría a mejorar la gobernanza y a obtener beneficios económicos gracias al incremento de la productividad animal, a la expansión del comercio y a una mayor seguridad alimentaria. También reportaría beneficios de salud pública, pues traería consigo una mejor higiene de los alimentos y una labor más eficaz de prevención y control de zoonosis.

### Palabras clave

Cadena de mando – Corrupción – Descentralización – Eficacia – Exigencia de mejor gobernanza – Gobernanza – Mecanismo de atención de reclamaciones – Prestación de servicios – Rendición de cuentas – Responsabilidad social – Sector público – Servicios Veterinarios – Tarjeta de puntuación ciudadana.





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