

GF-TADs

GLOBAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE
PROGRESSIVE CONTROL OF
TRANSBOUNDARY ANIMAL DISEASES



Food and Agriculture
Organization of the
United Nations



**Standing Group of Experts on African swine fever in the Baltics and Eastern Europe
Region under the GF-TADs**

Expert mission on African swine fever in Ukraine

Standing Group of Experts on ASF
in the Baltic and Eastern Europe region
GF TADs – 3rd Meeting (SGE3)
Moscow, 15 – 16 March 2016

Klaus Depner (Germany)

Disclaimer: The views and recommendations expressed in this document are those of the independent experts and may not in any circumstances be construed as the official position of their organisation, nor of the EC, OIE or FAO.

SGE Experts

- ***Klaus Depner*** (FLI, Germany, team leader)
- ***Silvia Bellini*** (IZSLER, Italy)
- ***Sergei Khomenko*** (FAO)
- ***Vittorio Guberti*** (ISPRA, Italy)

Period of mission

14 – 18 September 2015

Terms of Reference

- The experts should perform **on the spot visits** in order to gather data and be in a position to formulate recommendations on disease management.
 - The experts should work with the Veterinary Services in order to determine the following aspects:
 - If African swine fever (ASF) is **occurring in domestic pigs** (both in commercial sector and the so called back yard sector) and extent of the areas of occurrence.
 - If ASF is **occurring in wild boar** and geographical distribution of ASF in wild boar.
 - Formulate hypothesis on the **drivers of ASF occurrence** for domestic pigs and back yards.
 - **Propose measures** intended for the control and eradication of ASF under local conditions, in line with the OIE International Standards.
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Modus Operandi

(a three steps working approach)

- I. Understanding the national strategy for ASF control and eradication
(discussions at central level)
- II. Implementation of ASF strategy at regional level
(visit of affected districts/regions, discussion at local veterinary service)
- III. Implementation of ASF strategy at farm/hunting ground level
(visit of commercial farm, backyard, hunting ground)

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graph TD; A[III. Implementation of ASF strategy at farm/hunting ground level] --> B[DOMESTIC PIG SECTOR]; A --> C[WILD BOAR SECTOR];
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DOMESTIC PIG SECTOR
- Commercial sector
- Backyard sector

WILD BOAR SECTOR
- General management
- Specific control measures

Places visited:

- Central Veterinary Authority in Kiev

(Central Veterinary Administration within the Ministry of Agriculture)


- Vet administrations in Kiev oblast and Chernihiv oblast
Nizhyn district and Bahmach district in the Chernihiv oblast

- large pig commercial farm

- backyard farm

- hunting ground

Ukraine



ASF in Ukraine

Ukraine has about 7 million of pigs. Half of these pigs are kept in large CF and the other half in BYF.


By Sept. 2015 21 ASF outbreaks in DP and 17 cases in WB have been reported

- 2012: 1 outbreak
- 2013: 0
- 2014: 5 outbreaks; 11 cases
- 2015: 17 outbreaks; 5 cases

Most recent (end of 2014-2015) ASF occurred in the northern part in different regions. In most cases neither a geographical nor a timely connection becomes evident.

It appears that every time the virus has newly been introduced; no chain of infection has been identified.

National control strategy



Outbreak Centre (OC): BYF, village, CF, place where an infected wild boar has been found. The area of a OC can have a radius of 5 – 20 km. Within the OC all pigs are culled.

Protection Zone (PZ): 3 - 20 km. All pigs will be slaughtered, no movement of pigs out or in. CF can be excluded.

Surveillance Zone (SZ): 20-150 km. No movement of pigs out or in, pork products have to be heat treated.

Restricted zones (PZ + SZ) are occasionally clinically checked for ASF at least once in the surrounding villages or farms.

The quarantine time after an outbreak lasts 40 days after cleaning and disinfection.

Similar measures are applied for ASF in wild boar, the legislation does not differentiate between outbreaks in domestic pigs or cases in wild boar.

Surveillance domestic pigs

ASF surveillance is set up by the central administration.

Two samples (blood or spleen) per quarter from each commercial farm are taken randomly.

No specific prescriptions on which animals have to be sampled are in place, however sick or dead animals should be targeted.

Along the two ASF samples, it is recommended that at least 10% of dead animals should be sampled.

CF are reporting daily by phone to the local veterinary service the number of death and sick animals. All the communication is made by phone; no written reports are made.

During the past year, due to economical and strategical decisions (no money and no interference with enterprises) the veterinary service was not conducting any inspections on site.

Measures wild boar

Ukraine with its estimated 61.549 wild boar (official census dated 28 February 2015) has a rather low average population density. No hunting is allowed if population density is below 0.3 head/km² (3/1000 ha).

A proportion of hunting grounds have been privatized, while the remaining areas are managed by the state and NGOs. Evident differences in several management activities including reliability of censuses, artificial winter-feeding strategies, collection of the hunting bag data etc., and finally in ASF surveillance.

Veterinary Authority urged for depopulation of wild boar in the affected districts.

Results of depopulation suggests that very little progress.

ASF passive surveillance is not systematic. All cases in 2015 were isolated cases with no further detection of infected wild boar carcasses nearby.

In the absence of carcass detection effort and lack of active surveillance scheme for wild boar the real ASF situation in WB cannot be assessed and remains obscure.

Conclusions and recommendations

In case of an ASF outbreak the veterinary service reacts promptly and immediate measures are taken. Furthermore the veterinary service is linked with other state bodies involved in disease control and eradication (e.g. police, local administrations, state hunting associations, etc.).

Essential improvement is needed in the area of surveillance, (tracing and control activities during the outbreak) and risk based prevention. So far the monitoring and surveillance activities are not taking into account the epidemiological particularities and regional risks factors posed by ASF.

The surveillance activities are not based on scientific grounds, which take into considerations the biology of ASF. Therefore, the monitoring and surveillance data for DP and WB do not reflect the real epidemiological situation in Ukraine.

The surveillance plan conducted at present (2 samples per holding per quarter) is one of the weakest points. Under such premises ASF virus may only be detected if at least half of the district in a specific trimester will be infected.

Conclusions and recommendations

An independent national expert group should be established to assist the central and local veterinary authorities. The group should consist of epidemiologists, risk assessors, laboratory experts, wild life experts.

A scientifically based ASF risk assessment following OIE guidelines should be performed focusing on: (i) possible risks of ASF virus spread, (ii) the best management options for domestic pigs and wild boar, both in infected areas and in the bordering risk areas, (iii) the suitability, effectiveness and the practical aspects of implementation of the main measures.

On the basis of the epidemiological situation and a properly conducted risk assessment following OIE guidelines, the group should define:

- the appropriate measures of surveillance/control;
- a sampling scheme;
- a testing regime for clinical and laboratory examinations.

Conclusions and recommendations

The surveillance and monitoring activities should be based on the biological characteristics of ASF. Surveillance in domestic pigs should be focused on ASF early detection and thus considering sick/dead animals avoiding planning in advance the number of animals to be tested.

The present level of active surveillance is so low that early detected of ASF will fail. It would be more profitable if active surveillance could be replaced by passive surveillance triggered by the report of dead animals (backyard sector) and evident changes in the health status of pigs on commercial farms..

Important is to test a representative number of relevant animals in due time. A better sampling regime for domestic pigs and wild boar based on scientific grounds aiming of improving ASF prevention efforts does not necessarily imply that more tests have to be conducted.

ASF training courses for veterinary inspectors at regional level following OIE guidelines are recommended. In particular the epidemiological aspects of the disease should be discussed and elaborated in particular focussing on early detection and prevention.