



**Standing Group of Experts on African swine fever  
in the Baltic and Eastern Europe region**  
under the GF-TADs umbrella

**Eighth meeting (SGE8)**

**Chisinau, Moldova, 20-21 September 2017**

# Final recommendations

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**The SGE ASF recommends that:**

**General**

1. The Czech Republic become a full member of the SGE ASF, and as such participate in future SGE ASF meetings to share their experience and receive relevant guidance;
2. A SGE ASF field mission be sent to Romania and Czech Republic as soon as possible, to understand in depth field aspects and collate best practises in the prevention and control of ASF in the region;
3. Countries continue to implement the recommendations of all previous SGE ASF meetings;
4. OIE and FAO devote efforts to produce the GF-TADs Handbook on hunting biosecurity before the next SGE ASF meeting, as a way to provide technical specifications for operators;
5. Countries check if legislation is fit for purpose of ASF prevention and control, in line with OIE international standards;
6. The SGE ASF9 meeting (SGE ASF9) be organised in Ukraine [SGE ASF9] in spring 2018 and in Poland [SGE ASF10] in fall 2018; the SGE ASF9 meeting will focus on 'Cross border cooperation addressing irregular movements of pigs and their products'.

**Risk communication**

7. Countries develop/update a risk communication strategy for the eradication of ASF, identifying target groups (farmers; hunters; travellers; public at large; as well as policy makers; and all other

groups that could positively influence ASF eradication), key tailored messages, and communication channels; the OIE Focal Point for communication is a key resource person to do so;

8. Given that the latest theories related to risk communication recognise several steps for target groups to take actions (e.g. maintenance or relapse steps), countries sustain communication efforts in the long run (medium to long term). Adequate resources should therefore be allocated to these efforts over time;
9. Special attention should be given to ASF awareness campaigns targeting hunters since they are pivotal to ensure their cooperation. Additional incentives to promote their cooperation can be foreseen.

#### **Laboratory diagnostics and capability**

10. Preparedness for disease prevention and management be ensured. This includes adequate training for laboratory staff and maintaining adequate laboratory stocks of reagents and consumables. Prepare national plan for scaling up diagnostic capabilities in case of drastic increase of diagnostic needs;
11. Countries communicate to the appropriate audiences (e.g. veterinarians, hunters) on the adequate sample collection and dispatch procedures;
12. Each National Reference Laboratory carry out regular proficiency tests to ensure the accuracy and appropriateness of its diagnostic capabilities;
13. The diagnostic tests (agent identification, virus isolation, serological testing) be fully compliant with the provisions of the OIE Manual of diagnostic tests and vaccines for Terrestrial Animals;
14. Reference laboratories should have the adequate biosecurity level to deal with either liver virus or inactivated samples. Diagnostic labs performing routine screening tests for surveillance purposes may operate under biosecurity level 2.

#### **Other technical recommendations**

15. Countries implement passive surveillance (cornerstone for controlling this disease), based on PCR; active surveillance should come into play in a second instance only. For disease purpose management the PCR is fundamental as it allows for early warning. Serology has only secondary research-oriented value;
16. Countries review their wild boar management options in light of the experience brought by the Czech Republic, highlighting the benefits of good communication with hunters. The specific measures applied in the infected area (such as ban on hunting, active search of wild boar carcasses by authorised people only), in the surrounding higher risk area (such as active hunting and disposal of the carcasses without evisceration) and in the lower risk areas around (such as intensified hunting) should be assessed in order to learn from this new experience and adapt the approach consequently to wild boar management in case of occurrence of ASF.